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Abstract
Many schools in large urban districts have more applicants than seats. Centralized school assignment algorithms ration seats at over-subscribed schools using
randomly assigned lottery numbers, non-lottery tie-breakers like test scores, or
both. The New York City public high school match illustrates the latter, using
test scores and other criteria to rank applicants at “screened” schools, combined
with lottery tie-breaking at unscreened “lottery” schools. We show how to identify causal effects of school attendance in such settings. Our approach generalizes
regression discontinuity methods to allow for multiple treatments and multiple
running variables, some of which are randomly assigned. The key to this generalization is a local propensity score that quantifies the school assignment probabilities induced by lottery and non-lottery tie-breakers. The local propensity score
is applied in an empirical assessment of the predictive value of New York City’s
school report cards. Schools that receive a high grade indeed improve SAT math
scores and increase graduation rates, though by much less than OLS estimates
suggest. Selection bias in OLS estimates is egregious for screened schools.
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Introduction

Large school districts increasingly use sophisticated centralized assignment mechanisms to
match students and schools. In addition to producing fair and transparent admissions decisions, centralized assignment offers a unique resource for research on schools: the data these
systems generate can be used to construct unbiased estimates of school value-added. This
research dividend arises from the tie-breaking embedded in centralized assignment. Many
school assignment schemes rely on the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm, which takes as
input information on applicant preferences and school priorities. In settings where seats are
scarce, DA rations seats at oversubscribed schools using tie-breaking variables, producing
quasi-experimental assignment of students to schools.
Many districts break ties with a uniformly distributed random variable, often described
as a lottery number. Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a) show that DA with lottery tie-breaking
assigns students to schools as if in a stratified randomized trial. That is, conditional on
preferences and priorities, the assignments generated by such systems are randomly assigned
and therefore independent of potential outcomes. In practice, however, preferences and
priorities, which we call applicant type, are too finely distributed for full non-parametric
conditioning to be useful. We must therefore pool applicants of different types, while avoiding
any omitted variables bias that might arise from the fact that type predicts outcomes.
The key to type pooling is the DA propensity score, defined as the probability of school
assignment conditional on applicant type. In a mechanism with lottery tie-breaking, conditioning on the scalar DA propensity score is sufficient to make school assignment independent
of potential outcomes. Moreover, the distribution of the scalar propensity score turns out to
be much coarser than the distribution of types.1
This paper generalizes the propensity score to DA-based assignment mechanisms in which
tie-breaking variables are not limited to randomly assigned lottery numbers. Selective exam
schools, for instance, admit students with high test scores, and students with higher scores
tend to have better achievement and graduation outcomes regardless of where they enroll.
We refer to such scenarios as involving general tie-breaking.2 Matching markets with general
1

The propensity score theorem says that for research designs in which treatment status, Di , is independent of potential outcomes conditional on covariates, Xi , treatment status is also independent of potential
outcomes conditional on the propensity score, that is, conditional on E[Di |Xi ]. In work building on Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a), the DA propensity score has been used to study schools (Bergman, 2018), management
training (Abebe et al., 2019), and entrepreneurship training (Pérez Vincent and Ubfal, 2019).
2
Non-lottery tie-breaking embedded in centralized assignment schemes has been used in econometric
research on schools in Chile (Hastings et al., 2013; Zimmerman, 2019), Ghana (Ajayi, 2014), Italy (Fort
et al., 2020), Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2014), Norway (Kirkeboen et al., 2016), Romania (Pop-Eleches
and Urquiola, 2013), Trinidad and Tobago (Jackson, 2010, 2012; Beuermann et al., 2016), and the U.S.
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2014; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014; Barrow et al., 2016). These studies treat individual

tie-breaking raise challenges beyond those addressed in the Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a)
study of DA with lottery tie-breaking.
The most important complication raised by general tie-breaking arises from the fact that
seat assignment is no longer independent of potential outcomes conditional on applicant type.
This problem is intimately entwined with the identification challenge raised by regression
discontinuity (RD) designs, which typically compare candidates for treatment on either side
of a qualifying test score cutoff. In particular, non-lottery tie-breakers play the role of an
RD running variable and are likewise a source of omitted variables bias. The setting of
interest here, however, is far more complex than the typical RD design: DA may involve
many treatments, tie-breakers, and cutoffs.
A further barrier to causal inference comes from the fact that the propensity score in
this general tie-breaking setting depends on the unknown distribution of non-lottery tiebreakers conditional on type. Consequently, the propensity score under general tie-breaking
may be no coarser than the underlying high-dimensional type distribution. When the score
distribution is no coarser than the type distribution, score conditioning is pointless.
These problems are solved here by introducing a local DA propensity score that quantifies the probability of school assignment induced by a combination of non-lottery and lottery
tie-breakers. This score is “local” in the sense that it is constructed using the fact that continuously distributed non-lottery tie-breakers are locally uniformly distributed. Combining
this property with the (globally) known distribution of lottery tie-breakers yields a formula
for the assignment probabilities induced by any DA match. Conditional on the local DA
propensity score, school assignments are shown to be asymptotically randomly assigned.
Moreover, like the DA propensity score for lottery tie-breaking, the local DA propensity
score has a distribution far coarser than the underlying type distribution.
Our analytical approach builds on Hahn et al. (2001) and other pioneering econometric
contributions to the development of non-parametric RD designs. We also build on the
more recent local random assignment interpretation of nonparametric RD.3 The resulting
theoretical framework allows us to quantify the probability of school assignment as a function
of a few features of student type and tie-breakers, such as proximity to the admissions
cutoffs determined by DA and the identity of key cutoffs for each applicant. By integrating
nonparametric RD with Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)’s propensity score theorem and largemarket matching theory, our theoretical results provide a framework suitable for causal
schools and tie-breakers in isolation, without exploiting centralized assignment. Related methodological work
exploring regression discontinuity designs with multiple assignment variables and multiple cutoffs includes
Papay et al. (2011); Zajonc (2012); Wong et al. (2013a); Cattaneo et al. (2016a).
3
See, among others, Frolich (2007); Cattaneo et al. (2015, 2017); Frandsen (2017); Sekhon and Titiunik
(2017); Frolich and Huber (2019); and Arai et al. (2019).
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inference in a wide variety of applications.
The research value of the local DA propensity score is demonstrated through an analysis
of New York City (NYC) high school report cards. Specifically, we ask whether schools
distinguished by “Grade A” on the district’s school report card indeed signify high quality
schools that boost their students’ achievement and improve other outcomes. Alternatively,
the good performance of most Grade A students may reflect omitted variables bias. The
distinction between causal effects and omitted variables bias is especially interesting in light
of an ongoing debate over access to New York’s academically selective schools, also called
screened schools, which are especially likely to be graded A (see, e.g., Brody (2019) and Veiga
(2018)). We identify the causal effects of Grade A school attendance by exploiting the NYC
high school match. NYC employs a DA mechanism integrating non-lottery screened school
tie-breaking with a common lottery tie-breaker at lottery schools. In fact, NYC screened
schools design their own tie-breakers based on middle school transcripts, interviews, and
other factors.
The effects of Grade A school attendance are estimated here using instrumental variables
constructed from the school assignment offers generated by the NYC high school match.
Specifically, our two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimators use assignment offers as instrumental variables for Grade A school attendance, while controlling for the local DA propensity
score. The resulting estimates suggest that Grade A attendance boosts SAT math scores
modestly and may increase high school graduation rates a little. But these effects are much
smaller than those the corresponding ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Grade A
value-added would suggest.
We also compare 2SLS estimates of Grade A effects computed separately for NYC’s
screened and lottery schools, a comparison that shows the two sorts of schools to have
similar effects. This finding therefore implies that OLS estimates showing a large Grade
A screened school advantage are especially misleading. The distinction between screened
and lottery schools has been central to the ongoing debate over NYC school access and
quality. Our comparison suggests that the public concern with this sort of treatment effect
heterogeneity may be misplaced. Treatment effect heterogeneity may be limited, supporting
our assumption of constant treatment effects conditional on observables.4
The next section shows how DA can be used to identify causal effects of school attendance.
Section 3 illustrates key ideas in a setting with a single non-lottery tie-breaker. Section 4
derives a formula for the local DA propensity score in a market with general tie-breaking.
4

The analysis here allows for treatment effect heterogeneity as a function of observable student and school
characteristics. Our working paper shows how DA in markets with general tie-breaking identifies average
causal affects for applicants with tie-breaker values away from screened-school cutoffs (Abdulkadiroğlu et al.
(2019)). We leave other questions related to unobserved heterogeneity for future work.

3

This section also derives a consistent estimator of the local propensity score. Section 5 uses
these theoretical results to estimate causal effects of attending Grade A schools.5

2

Using Centralized Assignment to Eliminate Omitted
Variables Bias

The NYC school report cards published from 2007-13 graded high schools on the basis of
student achievement, graduation rates, and other criteria. These grades were part of an accountability system meant to help parents choose high quality schools. In practice, however,
report card grades computed without extensive control for student characteristics reflect
students’ ability and family background as well as school quality. Systematic differences in
student body composition are a powerful source of bias in school report cards. It’s therefore
worth asking whether a student who is randomly assigned to a Grade A high school indeed
learns more and is more likely to graduate as a result.
We answer this question using instrumental variables derived from NYC’s DA-based
assignment of high school seats. The NYC high school match generates a single school
assignment for each applicant as a function of applicants’ preferences over schools, schoolspecific priorities, and a set of tie-breaking variables that distinguish between applicants who
share preferences and priorities.6 Because they’re a function of student characteristics like
preferences and test scores, NYC assignments are not randomly assigned. We show, however,
that conditional on the local DA propensity score, DA-generated assignments of a seat at
school s provide credible instruments for enrollment at school s. This result motivates a
two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification where the endogenous treatment is enrollment
at any Grade A school while the instrument is DA-generated assignment of a seat at any
Grade A school.
Our identification strategy builds on the large-market “continuum” model of DA detailed
in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a). The large-market model is extended here to allow for
multiple and non-lottery tie-breakers. To that end, let s = 0, 1, ..., S index schools, where
5

Our theoretical analysis covers any mechanism that can be computed by student-proposing DA. This
DA class includes student-proposing DA, serial dictatorship, the immediate acceptance (Boston) mechanism
(Ergin and Sönmez, 2006), China’s parallel mechanisms (Chen and Kesten, 2017), England’s first-preferencefirst mechanisms (Pathak and Sönmez, 2013), and the Taiwan mechanism (Dur et al., 2018). In large
markets satisfying regularity conditions that imply a unique stable matching, the relevant DA class also
includes school-proposing as well as applicant-proposing DA (these conditions are spelled out in Azevedo
and Leshno (2016)). The DA class omits the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism defined for school choice
by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003).
6
Seat assignment at some of NYC’s selective enrollment “exam schools” is determined by a separate
match. NYC charter schools use school-specific lotteries. Applicants are free to seek exam school and
charter school seats as well as an assignment in the traditional sector.
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s = 0 represents an outside option. Applicants are assumed to be identified by an index,
i, drawn from the unit interval [0, 1]. The large market model is “large” by virtue of this
assumption.
Applicant i’s preferences over schools constitute a strict partial ordering, i , where a i b
means that i prefers school a to school b. Each applicant is also granted a priority at every
school. For example, schools may prioritize applicants who live nearby or with currently
enrolled siblings. Let ρis ∈ {1, ..., K, ∞} denote applicant i’s priority at school s, where
ρis < ρjs means school s prioritizes i over j. We use ρis = ∞ to indicate that i is ineligible
for school s. The vector ρi = (ρi1 , ..., ρiS ) records applicant i’s priorities at each school.
Applicant type is then defined as θi = (i , ρi ), that is, the combination of an applicant’s
preferences and priorities at all schools. Let Θs denote the set of types, θ, that ranks s.
In addition to applicant type, DA matches applicants to seats as a function of a set of
tie-breaking variables. We leave DA mechanics for Section 4; at this point, it’s enough to
establish notation for DA inputs. Most importantly, our analysis of markets with general tiebreaking requires notation to keep track of tie-breakers. Let v ∈ {1, ..., V } index tie-breakers
and let Sv be the set of schools using tie-breaker v. We assume that each school uses a single
tie-breaker. Scalar random variable Riv denotes applicant i’s tie-breaker v. Some of these
are uniformly distributed lottery numbers. The set of non-lottery Riv used at schools ranked
by applicant i are collected in the vector Ri . Without loss of generality, we assume that ties
are broken in favor of applicants with the smaller tie-breaker value. DA uses θi , Ri , and the
set of lottery tie-breakers for all i to assign applicants to schools.
We are interested in using the assignment variation resulting from DA to estimate the
causal effect of Ci , a variable indicating student i’s attendance at (or years of enrollment in)
any Grade A school. Outcome variables, denoted Yi , include SAT scores and high school
graduation status. In a DA match like the one in NYC, Ci is not randomly assigned, but
rather reflects student preferences, school priorities, tie-breaking variables, as well as decisions whether or not to enroll at school s when offered a seat there through the match. The
potential for omitted variables bias induced by the process determining Ci can be eliminated
by an instrumental variables strategy that exploits our understanding of the structure of
matching markets.
The instruments used for this purpose are a function of individual school assignments,
indicated by Di (s) for the assignment of student i to a seat at school s. Because DA generates
a single assignment for each student, a dummy for any Grade A assignment, denoted DAi , is
the sum of dummies indicating all assignments to individual Grade A schools. DAi provides
a natural instrument for Ci . In particular, we show below that 2SLS consistently estimates
the effect of Ci on Yi in the context of a linear constant-effects causal model that can be
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written as:
Yi = βCi + f2 (θi , Ri , δ) + ηi ,

(1)

where β is the causal effect of interest and the associated first stage equation is
Ci = γDAi + f1 (θi , Ri , δ) + νi .

(2)

The terms f1 (θi , Ri , δ) and f2 (θi , Ri , δ) are functions of type and non-lottery tie-breakers, as
well as a bandwidth, δ ∈ R, that’s integral to the local DA propensity score.
Our goal is to specify f1 (θi , Ri , δ) and f2 (θi , Ri , δ) so that 2SLS estimates of β are consistent. Because (1) is seen as a model for potential outcomes rather than a regression equation,
consistency requires that DAi and ηi be uncorrelated. The relevant identification assumption
can be written:
E[ηi DAi ] ≈ 0,
(3)
where ≈ means asymptotic equality as δ → 0, in a manner detailed below. Briefly, our
main theoretical result establishes limiting local conditional mean independence of school
assignments from applicant characteristics and potential outcomes, yielding (3). This result
specifies f1 (θi , Ri , δ) and f2 (θi , Ri , δ) to be easily-computed functions of the local propensity
score and elements of Ri .
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a) derive the relevant DA propensity score for a scenario with
lottery tie-breaking only. Lottery tie-breaking obviates the need for a bandwidth and control
for components of Ri . Many applications of DA use non-lottery tie-breaking, however.
The task here is to derive the propensity score for elaborate matches like that in NYC,
which combines lottery tie-breaking with many school-specific non-lottery tie-breakers. The
resulting estimation strategy integrates propensity score methods with the nonparametric
approach to RD (introduced by Hahn et al. (2001)), and the local random assignment model
of RD (discussed by Frolich (2007); Cattaneo et al. (2015, 2017); Frandsen (2017), among
others). Our theoretical results can also be seen as generalizing nonparametric RD to allow
for many schools (treatments), many tie-breakers (running variables), and many cutoffs.

3

From Non-Lottery Tie-Breaking to Random Assignment in Serial Dictatorship

An analysis of a market with a single non-lottery tie-breaker and no priorities illuminates
key elements of our approach. DA in this case is known as serial dictatorship. Like the
6

general local DA score, the local DA score for serial dictatorship depends only on a handful
of statistics, including admissions cutoffs for schools ranked, and whether applicant i’s tiebreaker is close to cutoffs for schools using non-lottery tie-breakers. Conditional on this local
propensity score, school offers are asymptotically randomly assigned.
Serial dictatorship can be described as follows:
Order applicants by tie-breaker. Proceeding in order, assign each applicant to
his or her most preferred school among those with seats remaining.
Seating is constrained by a capacity vector, q = (q0 , q1 , q2 , ..., qS ), where qs ∈ [0, 1] is defined
as the proportion of the unit interval that can be seated at school s. We assume q0 = 1.
Serial dictatorship is used in Boston and New York City to allocate seats at selective public
exam schools.
Because serial dictatorship relies on a single tie-breaker, notation for the set of nonlottery tie-breakers, Ri , can be replaced by a scalar, Ri . As in Abdulkadiroğlu et al.
(2017a), tie-breakers for individuals are modelled as stochastic, meaning they are drawn
from a distribution for each applicant. Although Ri is not necessarily uniform, we assume
that it’s distributed with positive density over [0, 1], with continuously differentiable cumulative distribution function, FRi . These common support and smoothness assumptions
notwithstanding, tie-breakers may be correlated with type, so that Ri and Rj for applicants
i and j are not necessarily identically distributed, though they’re assumed to be independent
of one another. The probability that type θ applicants have a tie-breaker below any value r
is FR (r|θ) ≡ E[FRi (r)|θi = θ], where FRi (r) is FRi evaluated at r.
The serial dictatorship allocation is characterized by a set of tie-breaker cutoffs, denoted
τs for school s. For any school s that’s filled to capacity, τs is given by the tie-breaker of the
last (highest tie-breaker value) student assigned to s. Otherwise, τs = 1, a non-binding cutoff
reflecting excess capacity. We say an applicant qualifies at s when they have a tie-breaker
value that clears τs . Under serial dictatorship, students are assigned to s if and only if they:
• qualify at s (since seats are assigned in tie-breaker order)
• fail to qualify at any school they prefer to s (since serial dictatorship assigns available
seats at preferred schools first)
In large markets, cutoffs are constant, so stochastic variation in seat assignments arises solely
from the distribution of tie-breakers.

7

3.1

The Serial Dictatorship Propensity Score

Which cutoffs matter? Under serial dictatorship, the assignment probability faced by an
applicant of type θ at school s is determined by the cutoff at s and by cutoffs at schools
preferred to s. By virtue of single tie-breaking, it’s enough to know only one of the latter. In
particular, an applicant who fails to clear the highest cutoff among those at schools preferred
to s surely fails to do better than s. This leads us to define most informative disqualification
(MID), a scalar parameter for each applicant type and school. MID tells us how the tiebreaker distribution among type θ applicants to s is truncated by disqualification at the
schools type θ applicants prefer to s.
Because MID for type θ at school s is defined with reference to the set of schools θ prefers
to s, we define:
Bθs = {s0 6= s | s0 θ s} for each θ ∈ Θs ,
(4)
the set of schools type θ prefers to s. For each type and school, M IDθs is a function of
tie-breaker cutoffs at schools in Bθs , specifically:
(
M IDθs ≡

0
max{τb | b ∈ Bθs }

if Bθs = ∅
otherwise.

(5)

M IDθs is zero when school s is ranked first since all who rank s first compete for a seat
there. The second line reflects the fact that an applicant who ranks s second is seated there
only when disqualified at the school they’ve ranked first, while applicants who rank s third
are seated there when disqualified at their first and second choices, and so on. Moreover,
anyone who fails to clear cutoff τb is surely disqualified at schools with less forgiving cutoffs.
For example, applicants who fail to qualify at a school with a cutoff of 0.6 are disqualified
at a school with cutoff 0.4.
Note that an applicant of type θ cannot be seated at s when M IDθs > τs . This is the
scenario sketched in the top panel of Figure 1, which illustrates the forces determining SD
assignment rates. On the other hand, assignment rates when M IDθs ≤ τs are given by the
probability that:
M IDθs < Ri ≤ τs ,
an event described in the middle panel of Figure 1. These facts are collected in the following
proposition, which is implied by a more general result for DA proved in the online appendix.
Proposition 1 (Propensity Score in Serial Dictatorship). Suppose seats in a large market
are assigned by serial dictatorship. Let ps (θ) = E[Di (s)|θi = θ] denote the type θ propensity

8

score for assignment to s. For all schools s and θ ∈ Θs , we have:
ps (θ) = max {0, FR (τs |θ) − FR (M IDθs |θ)} .
Proposition 1 says that the serial dictatorship assignment probability, positive only when
the tie-breaker cutoff at s exceeds M IDθs , is given by the size of the group with Ri between
M IDθs and τs . This is
FR (τs |θ) − FR (M IDθs |θ).
With a uniformly distributed lottery number, the serial dictatorship propensity score simplifies to τs − M IDθs , a scenario noted in Figure 1. In this case, the assignment probability
for each applicant is determined by τs and M IDθs alone. Given these two cutoffs, seats at
s are randomly assigned.

3.2

Serial Dictatorship Goes Local

With non-lottery tie-breaking, the serial dictatorship propensity score depends on the conditional distribution function, FR (·|θ) evaluated at τs and M IDθs , rather than the cutoffs
themselves. This dependence leaves us with two econometric challenges. First, FR (·|θ) is
unknown. This precludes computation of the propensity score by repeatedly sampling from
FR (·|θ). Second, FR (·|θ), is likely to depend on θ, so the score in Proposition 1 need not have
coarser support than does θ. This is in spite of the fact many applicants with different values
of θ share the same M IDθs . Finally, although controlling for ps (θ) eliminates confounding
from type, assignments are a function of tie-breakers as well as type. Confounding from
non-lottery tie-breakers remains even after conditioning on ps (θ).
These challenges are met here by focusing on assignment probabilities for applicants
with tie-breaker realizations close to key cutoffs. Specifically, for each τs , define an interval,
(τs −δ, τs +δ], where parameter δ is a bandwidth analogous to that used for nonparametric RD
estimation. A local propensity score treats the qualification status of applicants inside this
interval as randomly assigned. This assumption is justified by the fact that, given continuous
differentiability of tie-breaker distributions, non-lottery tie-breakers have a limiting uniform
distribution as the bandwidth shrinks to zero.
The following Proposition uses this fact to characterize the local serial dictatorship
propensity score:
Proposition 2 (Local Serial Dictatorship Propensity Score). Suppose seats in a large market
are assigned by serial dictatorship. Also, let Wi be any applicant characteristic other than

9

Figure 1: Assignment Probabilities under Serial Dictatorship
A. Never seated at s

Assignment Probability
Assigned 𝑠′ ≻ 𝑠

τ! < 𝑀𝐼𝐷"!

Rejected at s

Ri
0

MIDθs

τs

0

1

B. Propensity Score at s
Assigned 𝑠′ ≻ 𝑠

Offered a seat at s

Rejected at s

Ri

𝑀𝐼𝐷"! < τ!
0

MIDθs

τs

1

τ! − 𝑀𝐼𝐷"!

when Ri is uniform

FR(τ! |𝜃) − 𝐹R(𝑀𝐼𝐷"! |𝜃) when Ri has distribution F

C. Local Propensity Score at s
Local Propensity Score is 0.5
𝑀𝐼𝐷"! < τ!

Ri
0

MIDθs- 𝛿 MIDθs MIDθs+ 𝛿

𝜏! − 𝛿

τ!

𝜏! + 𝛿

1

0

if Ri ≤ 𝑀𝐼𝐷"! − 𝛿 or Ri > 𝜏! + δ

1

if Ri ∈ (𝑀𝐼𝐷𝜃𝑠 + 𝛿, 𝜏𝑠 − 𝛿]

0.5

if Ri ∈ 𝜏! − δ, 𝜏! + δ or Ri ∈ (𝑀𝐼𝐷𝜃𝑠 − 𝛿, 𝑀𝐼𝐷𝜃𝑠 + 𝛿]

Notes: This figure illustrates the assignment probability at school s under serial dictatorship. Ri is the
tie-breaker. M IDθs is the most forgiving cutoff at schools preferred to s and τs is the cutoff at s.

type that is unchanged by school assignment.7 Finally, assume τs 6= τs0 for all s 6= s0 unless
both are 1. Then,
E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Wi = w] = 0 if τs < M IDθs .
Otherwise,
lim E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Wi = w, Ri ≤ M IDθs − δ] = lim E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Wi = w, Ri > τs + δ)] = 0,

δ→0

δ→0

lim E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Wi = w, Ri ∈ (M IDθs + δ, τs − δ]] = 1,

δ→0

lim E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Wi = w, Ri ∈ (M IDθs − δ, M IDθs + δ]]

δ→0

= lim E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Wi = w, Ri ∈ (τs − δ, τs + δ]] = 0.5.
δ→0

This follows from a more general result for DA presented in the next section.
Proposition 2 describes a key conditional independence result: the limiting local probability of seat assignment in serial dictatorship takes on only three values and is unre7

Let Wi = Σs Di (s)Wi (s), where Wi (s) is the potential value of Wi revealed when Di (s) = 1. We say
Wi is unchanged by school assignment when Wi (s) = Wi (s0 ) for all s 6= s0 . Examples include demographic
characteristics and potential outcomes.
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lated to applicant characteristics. Note that the cases enumerated in the proposition (when
τs > M IDθs ) partition the tie-breaker line as sketched in Figure 1. Applicants with tiebreaker values above the cutoff at s are disqualified at s and so cannot be seated there, while
applicants with tie-breaker values below M IDθs are qualified at a school they prefer to s
and so will be seated elsewhere. Applicants with tie-breakers strictly between M IDθs and
τs are surely assigned to s. Finally, type θ applicants with tie-breakers near either M IDθs
or the cutoff at s are seated with probability approximately equal to one-half. Nearness in
this case means inside the interval defined by bandwidth δ.
The driving force behind Proposition 2 is the assumption that the tie-breaker distribution is continuously differentiable. In a shrinking window, the tie-breaker density therefore approaches that of a uniform distribution, so the limiting qualification rate is one-half
(See Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017b) or Bugni and Canay (2018) for formal proof of this
claim). The assumption of a continuously differentiable tie-breaker distribution is analogous to the continuous running variable assumption invoked in Lee (2008) and to a local
smoothness assumption in Dong (2018). Continuity of tie-breaker distributions implies a
weaker smoothness condition asserting continuity at cutoffs of the conditional expectation
functions of potential outcomes given running variables. We favor the stronger continuity
assumption because the implied local random assignment provides a scaffold for construction
of assignment probabilities in more complicated matching scenarios.8

4

The Local DA Propensity Score

Many school districts assign seats using a version of student-proposing DA, which can be
described like this:
Each applicant proposes to his or her most preferred school. Each school ranks
these proposals, first by priority then by tie-breaker within priority groups, provisionally admitting the highest-ranked applicants in this order up to its capacity.
Other applicants are rejected.
Each rejected applicant proposes to his or her next most preferred school. Each
school ranks these new proposals together with applicants admitted provisionally in the previous round, first by priority and then by tie-breaker. From this
8

The connection between continuity of running variable distributions and conditional expectation functions is noted by Dong (2018) and Arai et al. (2019). Antecedents for the local random assignment idea
include an unpublished appendix to Frolich (2007) and an unpublished draft of Frandsen (2017), which
shows something similar for an asymmetric bandwidth. See also Cattaneo et al. (2015) and Frolich and
Huber (2019).
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pool, the school again provisionally admits those ranked highest up to capacity,
rejecting the rest.
The algorithm terminates when there are no new proposals (some applicants may
remain unassigned).
Different schools may use different tie-breakers. For example, the NYC high school
match includes a diverse set of screened schools (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005, 2009). These
schools order applicants using school-specific tie-breakers that are derived from interviews,
auditions, or GPA in earlier grades, as well as test scores. The NYC match also includes
many unscreened schools, referred to here as lottery schools, that use a uniformly distributed
lottery number as tie-breaker. Lottery numbers are distributed independently of type and
potential outcomes, but non-lottery tie-breakers like entrance exam scores almost certainly
depend on these variables.

4.1

Key Assumptions and Main Theorem

We adopt the convention that tie-breaker indices are ordered such that lottery tie-breakers
come first. That is, v ∈ {1, ..., U }, where U ≤ V , indexes U lottery tie-breakers. Each lottery
tie-breaker, Riv for v = {1, ...U }, is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Non-lottery tie-breakers
are indexed by v ∈ {U + 1, ..., V }. The assumptions employed with general tie-breaking are
summarized as follows:
Assumption 1.
(i) For any tie-breaker indexed by v ∈ {1, ..., V } and applicants i 6= j, tie-breakers Riv and
Rjv are independent, though not necessarily identically distributed.
(ii) The unconditional joint distribution of non-lottery tie-breakers {Riv ; v = U + 1, ..., V }
for applicant i is continuously differentiable with positive density over [0, 1].
Let v(s) be a function that returns the index of the tie-breaker used at school s. By
definition, s ∈ Sv(s) . To combine applicants’ priority status and tie-breaking variables into a
single number for each school, we define applicant position at school s as:
πis = ρis + Riv(s) .
Since the difference between any two priorities is at least 1 and tie-breaking variables are
between 0 and 1, applicant order by position at s is lexicographic, first by priority then by tiebreaker. As noted in the discussion of serial dictatorship, we distinguish between tie-breakers
and priorities because the latter are fixed, while the former are random variables.
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We also generalize cutoffs to incorporate priorities; these DA cutoffs are denoted ξs . For
any school s that ends up filled to capacity, ξs is given by maxi {πis |Di (s) = 1}. Otherwise,
we set ξs = K + 1 to indicate that s has slack (recall that K is the lowest possible priority).
DA assigns a seat at school s to any applicant i ranking s who has
πis ≤ ξs and πib > ξb for all b i s.

(6)

This is a consequence of the fact that the student-proposing DA is stable.9 In large markets,
ξs is fixed as tie breakers are drawn and re-drawn. DA-induced school assignment rates are
therefore determined by the distribution of stochastic tie-breakers evaluated at fixed school
cutoffs. Condition (6) nests our characterization of seat assignment under serial dictatorship
since we can set ρis = 0 for all applicants and use a single tie-breaker to determine position.
Statement (6) then says that Ri ≤ τs and Ri > M IDθs for applicants with θi = θ.
The DA propensity score is the probability of the event described by (6). This probability
is determined in part by marginal priority at school s, denoted ρs and defined as int(ξs ), the
integer part of the DA cutoff. Conditional on rejection by all preferred schools, applicants to
s are assigned s with certainty if ρis < ρs , that is, if they clear marginal priority. Applicants
with ρis > ρs have no chance of finding a seat at s. Applicants for whom ρis = ρs are marginal:
these applicants are seated at s when their tie-breaker values fall below tie-breaker cutoff τs .
This quantity can therefore be written as the decimal part of the DA cutoff:
τs = ξs − ρs .
Applicants with marginal priority have ρis = ρs , so πis ≤ ξs ⇔ Riv(s) ≤ τs .
In addition to marginal priority, the local DA propensity score is conditioned on applicant
position relative to screened school cutoffs. To describe this conditioning, define a set of
variables, tis (δ), as follows:


 n
tis (δ) = a


c

if ρθs > ρs or, if v(s) > U, ρθs = ρs and Riv(s) > τs + δ
if ρθs < ρs or, if v(s) > U, ρθs = ρs and Riv(s) ≤ τs − δ
if ρθs = ρs and, if v(s) > U, Riv(s) ∈ (τs − δ, τs + δ],

where the mnemonic value labels n, a, c stand for never seated, always seated, and condition9
In particular, if an applicant is seated at s but prefers b, she must be qualified at s and not have been
assigned to b. Moreover, since DA-generated assignments at b are made in order of position, applicants not
assigned to b must be disqualified there.
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ally seated. It’s convenient to collect these variables in a vector,
Ti (δ) = [ti1 (δ), ..., tis (δ), ..., tiS (δ)].
Elements of Ti (δ) for unscreened schools are a function only of the partition of types
determined by marginal priority. For screened schools, however, Ti (δ) also encodes the
relationship between tie-breakers and cutoffs. Never-seated applicants to s cannot be seated
there, either because they fail to clear marginal priority at s or because they’re too far above
the cutoff when s is screened. Always-seated applicants to s are assigned s for sure when
they can’t do better, either because they clear marginal priority at s or because they’re well
below the cutoff at s when s is screened. Finally, conditionally-seated applicants to s are
randomized marginal priority applicants. Randomization is by lottery number when s is a
lottery school or by non-lottery tie-breaker within the bandwidth when s is screened.
With this machinery in hand, the local DA propensity score is defined as follows:
ψs (θ, T ) = lim E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T ],
δ→0

for T = [t1 , ..., ts , ..., tS ] where ts ∈ {n, a, c} for each s. This describes assignment probabilities as a function of type and cutoff proximity at each school. As in Proposition 2, formal
characterization of ψs (θ, T ) requires cutoffs be distinct:
Assumption 2. τs 6= τs0 for all s 6= s0 unless both are 1.
The formula characterizing ψs (θ, T ) builds on an extension of the M ID idea to a general
tie-breaking regime. First, the set of schools θ prefers to s, Bθs , is partitioned by tie-breakers
v
by defining Bθs
≡ {b ∈ Sv | b θ s} for each v. We then have:


 0
v
M IDθs =
1


v
max{τb | b ∈ Bθs
and ρθb = ρb }

v
v
if ρθb > ρb for all b ∈ Bθs
or if Bθs
=∅
v
if ρθb < ρb for some b ∈ Bθs
otherwise.

v
M IDθs
quantifies the extent to which qualification at schools using tie-breaker v(s) and that
type θ applicants prefer to s truncates the tie-breaker distribution among those contending
for seats at s.
Next, define:

v
v
ms (θ, T ) = |{v > U : M IDθs
= τb and tb = c for some b ∈ Bθs
}|.

This quantity counts the number of RD-style experiments created by the screened schools
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that type θ prefers to s.
v
The last preliminary to a formulation of local DA assignment scores uses M IDθs
and
ms (θ, T ) to compute disqualification rates at all schools preferred to s. We break this into two
pieces: variation generated by screened schools and variation generated by lottery schools.
As the bandwidth shrinks, the limiting disqualification probability at screened schools in Bθs
converges to
σs (θ, T ) = 0.5ms (θ,T ) .
(7)
The disqualification probability at lottery schools in Bθs is
U
Y
v
λs (θ) =
(1 − M IDθs
),

(8)

v=1

without regard to bandwidth.
To recap: the local DA score for type θ applicants is determined in part by the screened
v
, and at which
schools θ prefers to s. Relevant screened schools are those determining M IDθs
applicants are close to tie-breaker cutoffs. The variable ms (θ, T ) counts the number of tiebreakers involved in such close encounters. Applicants drawing screened school tie-breakers
v
close to τb for some b ∈ Bθs
face qualification rates of 0.5 for each tie-breaker v. Since
screened school disqualification is locally independent over tie-breakers, the term σs (θ, T )
computes the probability of not being assigned a screened school preferred to s. Likewise,
v
since the qualification rate at preferred lottery schools is M IDθs
, the term λs (θ) computes
the probability of not being assigned a lottery school preferred to s.
The following theorem combines these in a formula for the local DA propensity score:
Theorem 1 (Local DA Propensity Score with General Tie-breaking). Suppose seats in a
large market are assigned by DA with tie-breakers indexed by v, and suppose Assumptions 1
and 2 hold. For all schools s, θ, T and w, we have
ψs (θ, T ) = lim E[Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T, Wi = w] = 0,
δ→0

if (a) ts = n; or (b) tb = a for some b ∈ Bθs . Otherwise,


σs (θ, T )λs (θ)


)
(

v(s)

τs − M IDθs
ψs (θ, T ) =
σs (θ, T )λs (θ) max 0,
v(s)

1 − M IDθs



 σ (θ, T )λ (θ) × 0.5
s
s
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if ts = a
if ts = c and v(s) ≤ U
if ts = c and v(s) > U.

(9)

Theorem 1 starts with a scenario where applicants to s are either disqualified there or
assigned to a preferred school for sure.10 In this case, we need not worry about whether
s is a screened or lottery school. In other scenarios where applicants are surely qualified
at s, the probability of assignment to s is determined entirely by disqualification rates at
preferred screened schools and by truncation of lottery tie-breaker distributions at preferred
lottery schools. These sources of assignment risk combine to produce the first line of (9).
The conditional assignment probability at any lottery s, described on the second line of (9),
is determined by the disqualification rate at preferred schools and the qualification rate at
v(s)
s, where the latter is given by τs − M IDθs (to see this, note that λs (θ) includes the term
1 − M IDv(s) in the product over lottery tie-breakers). Similarly, the conditional assignment
probability at any screened s, on the third line of (9), is determined by the disqualification
rate at preferred schools and the qualification rate at s, where the latter is given by 0.5.
The Theorem covers the non-lottery tie-breaking serial dictatorship scenario in the previous section. With a single non-lottery tie-breaker, λs (θ) = 1. When ts = n or tb = a
for some b ∈ Bθs , the local propensity score at s is zero. Otherwise, suppose tb = n for all
b ∈ Bθs , so that ms (θ, T ) = 0. If ts = a, then the local propensity score is 1. If ts = c, then
the local propensity score is 0.5. Suppose, instead, that M IDθs = τb for some b ∈ Bθs , so
that ms (θ, T ) = 1. In this case, ts 6= c because cutoffs are distinct. If ts = a, then the local
propensity score is 0.5. Online Appendix B uses an example to illustrate the Theorem in
other scenarios.

4.2

Score Estimation

Theorem 1 characterizes the theoretical probability of school assignment in a large market
with a continuum of applicants. In reality, of course, the number of applicants is finite
and propensity scores must be estimated. We show here that, in an asymptotic sequence
that increases market size with a shrinking bandwidth, a sample analog of the local DA
score described by Theorem 1 converges uniformly to the corresponding local score for a
finite market. Our empirical application establishes the relevance of this asymptotic result
by showing that applicant characteristics are balanced by assignment status conditional on
estimates of the local DA propensity score.
The asymptotic sequence for the estimated local DA score works as follows: randomly
sample N applicants from a continuum economy. The applicant sample (of size N ) includes
information on each applicant’s type and the vector of large-market school capacities, qs ,
which give the proportion of N seats that can be seated at s. We observe realized tie-breaker
10
See the appendix for proof of the Theorem, along with other theoretical results, including derivation of
a non-limit form of the DA propensity score.
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values for each applicant, but not the underlying distribution of non-lottery tie-breakers. The
set of finitely many schools is unchanged along this sequence.
Fix the number of seats at school s in a sampled finite market to be the integer part of
N qs and run DA with these applicants and schools. We consider the limiting behavior of an
v
estimator computed using the estimated MˆIDθi s , τ̂s , and marginal priorities generated by
this single realization. Also, given a bandwidth δN > 0, we compute tis (δN ) for each i and
s, collecting these in vector Ti (δN ). These statistics then determine:
v
m̂s (θi , Ti (δN )) = |{v > U : MˆIDθi s = τ̂b and tib (δN ) = c for some b ∈ Bθvi s }|.

Our local DA score estimator, denoted ψ̂s (θi , Ti (δN )), is constructed by plugging these
ingredients into the formula in Theorem 1. That is, if (a) t̂is (δN ) = n; or (b) t̂ib (δN ) =
a for some b ∈ Bθi s , then ψ̂s (θi , Ti (δN )) = 0. Otherwise,
ψ̂s (θi , Ti (δN )) =


σ̂s (θi , Ti (δN ))λ̂s (θi )


 if tis (δN ) = a


v(s)
τ̂s −MˆIDθi s
if tis (δN ) = c and v(s) ≤ U
σ̂s (θi , Ti (δN ))λ̂s (θi ) max 0,
v(s)
1−MˆIDθi s



 σ̂ (θ , T (δ ))λ̂ (θ ) × 0.5
if tis (δN ) = c and v(s) > U,
s i
i N
s i

(10)

where
σ̂s (θi , Ti (δN )) = 0.5m̂s (θi ,Ti (δN ))
and

U
Y
v
(1 − MˆIDθi s ).
λ̂s (θi ) =
v=1

As a theoretical benchmark for the large-sample performance of ψ̂s , consider the true
local DA score for a finite market of size N . This is
ψN s (θ, T ) = lim EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T ],
δ→0

(11)

where EN is the expectation induced by the joint tie-breaker distribution for applicants in
the finite market. This quantity is defined by fixing the distribution of types and the vector
of proportional school capacities, as well as market size. ψN s (θ, T ) is then the limit of the
average of Di (s) across infinitely many tie-breaker draws in ever-narrowing bandwidths for
this finite market. Because tie-breaker distributions are assumed to have continuous density
in the neighborhood of any cutoff, the finite-market local propensity score is well-defined for
any positive δ.
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We’re interested in the gap between the estimator ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) and the true local score
ψN s (θ, T ) as N grows and δN shrinks. We show below that ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) converges uniformly
to ψN s (θ, T ) in our asymptotic sequence.
This result uses a regularity condition:
Assumption 3. (Rich support) In the population continuum market, for every school s and
every priority ρ held by a positive mass of applicants who rank s, the proportion of applicants
i with ρis = ρ who rank s first is also positive.
Uniform convergence of ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) is formalized below:
Theorem 2 (Consistency of the Estimated Local DA Propensity Score). In the asymptotic
sequence described above, and maintaining Assumptions 1-3, the estimated local DA propensity score ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) is a consistent estimator of ψN s (θ, T ) in the following sense: For any
δN such that δN → 0, N δN → ∞, and T (δn ) → T ,
p

sup |ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) − ψN s (θ, T )| −→ 0,
θ,s,T

as N → ∞.
This result (proved in the online appendix) justifies conditioning on an estimated local
propensity score to eliminate omitted variables bias in school attendance effect estimates.

4.3

Treatment Effect Estimation

Theorems 1 and 2 provide a foundation for causal inference. In combination with an exclusion restriction discussed below, these results imply that a dummy variable indicating
Grade A assignments is asymptotically independent of potential outcomes (represented by
the residuals in a equation (1)), conditional on an estimate of the Grade A local propensity
score. Let SA denote the set of Grade A schools. Because DA generates a single offer, the
local propensity score for Grade A assignment can be computed as:
ψ̂A (θi , Ti (δN )) =

X

ψ̂s (θi , Ti (δN )).

s∈SA

In other words, the local score for Grade A assignment is the sum of the scores for all Grade
A schools in the match.
These considerations lead to a 2SLS estimator with second and first stage equations that
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can be written in stylized form as:
Yi = βCi +

X

α2 (x)di (x) + g2 (Ri ; δN ) + ηi

(12)

x

Ci = γDAi +

X

α1 (x)di (x) + g1 (Ri ; δN ) + νi ,

(13)

x

where di (x) = 1{ψ̂A (θi , Ti (δN )) = x} and the set of parameters denoted α2 (x) and α1 (x)
provide saturated control for the local propensity score. As detailed in the next section,
functions g2 (Ri ; δN ) and g1 (Ri ; δN ) implement local linear control for screened school tiebreakers for applicants to these schools with t̂is (δN ) = c. Linking this with the empirical
strategy sketched at the outset, equation (12) is a version of of equation (1) that sets
f2 (θi , Ri , δ) =

X

α2 (x)di (x) + g2 (Ri ; δN ).

x

Likewise, equation (13) is a version of equation (2) with f1 (θi , Ri , δ) defined similarly.
Our implementation of score-controlled instrumental variables is inspired by the Calonico
et al. (2019) analysis of RD designs with covariates. Using a mix of simulation evidence and
theoretical reasoning, Calonico et al. (2019) argues that additive control for covariates in a
local linear regression model requires fewer assumptions and is likely to have better finitesample behavior than more elaborate procedures. The covariates of interest to us are a full
set of dummies for values in the support of the Grade A local propensity score. We’d like to
control for these while also benefiting from the good performance of local linear regression
estimators of conditional mean functions near cutoffs.11
Note that saturated regression-conditioning on the local propensity score eliminates applicants with score values of zero or one. This is apparent from an analogy with a fixed-effects
panel model. In panel data with multiple annual observations on individuals, estimation
with individual fixed effects is equivalent to estimation after subtracting person means from
regressors. Here, the “fixed effects” are coefficients on dummies for each possible score value.
When the score value is 0 or 1 for applicants of a given type, assignment status is constant
and observations on applicants of this type drop out. We therefore say an applicant has
Grade A risk when ψ̂A (θi , Ti (δN )) ∈ (0, 1). The sample with risk contributes to parameter
estimation in models with saturated score control.
11

Calonico et al. (2019) discuss both sharp and fuzzy RD designs. The conclusions for sharp design carry
over to the fuzzy case in which cutoff clearance is used as an instrument. Equations (12) and (13) are said
to be stylized because they omit a number of implementation details supplied in the following section.
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Propensity score conditioning facilitates control for applicant type in the sample with
risk. In practice, local propensity score conditioning yields considerable dimension reduction
compared to full-type conditioning, as we would hope. The 2014 NYC high school match, for
example, involved 52,124 applicants of 47,074 distinct types. Of these, 42,461 types listed
a Grade A school on their application to the high school match. By contrast, the local
propensity score for Grade A school assignment takes on only 2,054 values.

5

A Brief Report on NYC Report Cards

5.1

Doing DA in the Big Apple

Since the 2003-04 school year, the NYC Department of Education (DOE) has used DA to
assign rising ninth graders to high schools. Many high schools in the match host multiple
programs, each with their own admissions protocols. Applicants are matched to programs
rather than schools. Each applicant for a ninth grade seat can rank up to twelve programs.
All traditional public high schools participate in the match, but charter schools and NYC’s
specialized exam high schools have separate admissions procedures.12
The NYC match is structured like the general DA match described in Section 4: lottery
programs use a common uniformly distributed lottery number, while screened programs use
a variety of non-lottery tie-breaking variables. Screened tie-breakers are mostly distinct, with
one for each school or program, though some screened programs share a tie-breaker. In any
case, our theoretical framework accommodates all of NYC’s many tie-breaking protocols.13
Our analysis uses Theorems 1 and 2 to compute propensity scores for programs rather
than schools since programs are the unit of assignment. For our purposes, a lottery school
is a school hosting any lottery program. Other schools are defined as screened.14
In 2007, the NYC DOE launched a school accountability system that graded schools
from A to F. This mirrors similar accountability systems in Florida and other states. NYC’s
school grades were determined by achievement levels and, especially, achievement growth, as
12

Some special needs students are also matched separately. The centralized NYC high school match is
detailed in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005, 2009). Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2014) describe NYC exam school
admissions.
13
Screened tie-breakers are reported as an integer variable encoding the underlying tie-breaker order such
as a test score or portfolio summary score. We scale these so as to lie in (0, 1] by computing [Riv −minj Rjv +
1]/[maxj Rjv − minj Rjv + 1] for each tie-breaker v. This transformation produces a positive cutoff at s when
only one applicant is seated at s and a cutoff of 1 when all applicants who rank s are seated there.
14
Some NYC high schools sort applicants on a coarse screening tie-breaker that allows ties, breaking
these ties using the common lottery number. Schools of this type are treated as lottery schools, with priority
groups defined by values of the screened tie-breaker. Seats for NYC’s ed-opt programs are allocated to
two groups, one of which screens applicants using a single non-lottery tie-breaker and the other using the
common lottery number. The online appendix explains how ed-opt programs are handled by our analysis.

20

Figure 2: Sample NYC School Report Card

Progress Report 2011-12
PROGRESS REPORT

East Side Community School

PRINCIPAL:

A

Mark Federman

DBN:
ENROLLMENT:
SCHOOL TYPE:
PEER INDEX*:

OVERALL SCORE

out
of
100

73.6

OVERALL
PERCENTILE
RANK

75

QUALITY REVIEW
This school's
overall score is
greater than or
equal to that of
75 percent of
high schools.

For high schools, grades are based on cut scores determined prior to the
release of the Progress Report. Further, schools with a four year graduation
rate in the top third citywide cannot receive a grade lower than a C. Schools
in their first year, without a graduating class or in phase out receive a report
with no grade or score.

01M450
357
High School
2.38

Progress Report Grades - High School

*See p. 7 for more details on Peer Index.

WD

OVERALL
SCORE

out of 100

Well Developed ( 2007-08 )
RATING

SCORE RANGE

Well Developed
92 - 100
Proficient
72 - 91
Developing
47 - 71
Underdeveloped
25 - 46
The rating is based on three major categories of school
performance: instruction that prepares students for
college and careers, school organization and
management, and quality of the learning environment.

GRADE

SCORE RANGE

% OF SCHOOLS

A
B
C
D
F

70.0 or higher

35% of schools

58.0 - 69.9

37% of schools

47.0 - 57.9

20% of schools

40.0 - 46.9

5% of schools

A school that receives a Well Developed rating earned the
highest grade for highly effective teaching and learning
practice, strategic school management, and an excellent
quality learning environment. For more information, see:

39.9 or lower

3% of schools

http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/tools/review

Each school's Progress Report (1) measures student year-to-year progress, (2) compares the school to peer schools, and (3) rewards success in moving all
children forward, especially children with the greatest needs.

Overview
CATEGORY

SCORE

Student
Progress

33.0

GRADE DESCRIPTION

B

out of 55

Student
Performance
School
Environment
College and
Career Readiness

14.4

A

out of 20

10.9
out of 15

7.3
out of 10

Student Performance measures how many students graduated within 4 and 6 years
of starting high school, and the types of diplomas they earned.

A

School Environment measures student attendance and a survey of the school
community rating academic expectations, safety and respect, communication, and
engagement.

A

College and Career Readiness measures how well students are prepared for life
after high school on the basis of passing advanced courses, meeting English and
math standards, and enrolling in a post-secondary institution.
Schools receive additional credit for exceptional graduation and college/career
readiness outcomes of students with disabilities, English Language Learners, and
students who enter high school at a low performance level.

Closing the
8.0
Achievement Gap (16 max)
Overall Score

Student Progress measures the annual progress students make toward meeting the
state's graduation requirements by earning course credits and passing state
Regents exams.

73.6

A

out of 100

Performance Over Time

The overall grade is based on the total of all scores above. Category scores may not
add up to total score because of rounding.

Progress Report Implications

Notes: This
figure
report
forresultsEast
Community
School.
Progress Report
are the basis Side
for recognition
and potential rewards for school
Percentile
rank of this shows
school's overallthe
Progress2011/12
Report score for theprogress Strong
leaders, and poor results are an important factor in determining whether schools require
past three years:
www.crpe.org
intensive support or intervention. For more information, see:

Source:

100

80

88

85

http://schools.nyc.gov/community/planning/Support+and+Intervention.htm

75

60

State Accountability

40

well as by survey- and attendance-based features
of the school
environment. Growth looked
The school's current status:
In Good Standing
at credit accumulation, Regents test completion and pass rates; performance measures were
derived mostly from four- and six-year graduation rates. Some schools were ungraded. Figure
2 reproduces a sample letter-graded school progress report.15
The 2007 grading system was controversial. Proponents applauded the integration of multiple measures of school quality while opponents objected to the high-stakes consequences of
low school grades, such as school closure or consolidation. Rockoff and Turner (2011) provide
a partial validation of the system by showing that low grades seem to have sparked school
improvement. In 2014, the DOE replaced the 2007 scheme with school quality measures
20
0

2010

2011

2012

The Progress Report is a one-year snapshot of a school’s performance. The
Progress Report methodology has evolved over time in response to school and
community feedback, changes in state policy, and higher standards. For a
description of methodology changes, visit:

This designation is determined by the New York State Department of Education under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) Flexibility Waiver. More information on New
York State accountability can be found here:
http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/tools/accountability/default.htm

http://schools.nyc.gov/ProgressReport

15

Walcott (2012) details the NYC grading methodology used in this period. Note that the computation of
the grade of a school for a particular year uses only information from past years, so that there is no feedback
between school grades and the school’s current outcomes.
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that place less weight on test scores and more on curriculum characteristics and subjective
assessments of teaching quality. The relative merits of the old and new systems continue to
be debated.
The results reported here use application data from the 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14
school years (students in these application cohorts enrolled in the following school years).
Our sample includes first-time applicants seeking 9th grade seats, who submitted preferences
over programs in the main round of the NYC high school match. We obtained data on school
capacities and priorities, lottery numbers, and screened school tie-breakers, information that
allows us to replicate the match. Details related to match replication appear in the online
appendix.16
Table 1. New York City High School Performance and Characteristics
Grade A Schools
Grade B-F
All
Screened
Lottery
Schools
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A. Outcome Variable Means
SAT Math (200-800)
531
618
481
464
SAT Reading (200-800)
522
598
479
465
Graduation rate
0.78
0.93
0.71
0.64
College- and career-prepared index
0.65
0.86
0.54
0.39
College-ready index
0.59
0.84
0.45
0.34
Panel B. Student Body and Teacher Characteristics
Black
0.20
0.10
0.25
0.32
Hispanic
0.35
0.24
0.42
0.40
Special education
0.12
0.06
0.15
0.17
Free lunch
0.68
0.53
0.76
0.77
In Manhattan
0.27
0.49
0.14
0.16
Number of grade 9 students
420
454
401
413
Number of grade 12 students
374
439
337
351
High school size
1596
1798
1481
1509
Inexperienced teachers
0.11
0.09
0.12
0.11
Advanced degree teachers
0.53
0.60
0.49
0.50
New school
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00

Ungraded
Schools
(5)
440
449
0.41
0.27
0.24
0.39
0.43
0.27
0.75
0.28
86
53
426
0.28
0.30
0.21

School-year observations
355
101
254
694
715
Notes. This table reports student-weighted averages of means by school and year. Estimates are for cohorts
enrolled in ninth grade in 2012-13, 2013-14. A screened school is defined as any school without lottery
programs. Specialized and charter high schools admit applicants in a separate process and are considered
screened and lottery schools, respectively. The college-and-career-prepared and college-ready indices are on a
scale of 0 to 1. Graduation and college outcomes condition on ninth grade enrollment in the year following the
match; college outcomes are available for the first and second cohort only. Inexperienced teachers are defined
as those having 3 or fewer years of experience; advanced degree teachers are defined as those with a Masters
or higher degree. New schools are those that opened 1 or 2 years prior to the relevant cohort's ninth grade
enrollment.
16

Our analysis assigns report card grades to a cohort’s schools based on the report cards published in the
previous year. For the 2011/12 application cohort, for instance, we used the grades published in 2010/11.
On the other hand, applicant SAT scores from tests taken before 9th grade are dropped.
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Students at Grade A schools have higher average SAT scores and higher graduation rates
than do students at other schools. Differences in graduation rates across schools feature in
popular accounts of socioeconomic differences in school access (see, e.g., Harris and Fessenden
(2017) and Disare (2017)). Grade A students are also more likely than students attending
other schools to be deemed “college- and career-prepared” or “college-ready.”17 These and
other school characteristics are documented in Table 1, which reports statistics separately by
school grade and admissions regime. Achievement gaps between screened and lottery Grade
A schools are especially large, likely reflecting selection bias induced by test-based screening.
Screened Grade A schools have a majority white and Asian student body, the only group
of schools described in the table to do so (the table reports shares black and Hispanic).
These schools are also over-represented in Manhattan, a borough that includes most of
New York’s wealthiest neighborhoods (though average family income is higher on Staten
Island). Teacher experience is similar across school types, while screened Grade A schools
have somewhat more teachers with advanced degrees.
The first two columns of Table 2 describe the roughly 180,000 ninth graders enrolled
in the 2012-13, 2013-14, and 2014-15 school years. Students enrolled in a Grade A school,
including those enrolled in the Grade A schools assigned outside the match, are less likely
to be black or Hispanic and have higher baseline scores than the general population of 9th
graders. The 153,000 eighth graders who applied for ninth grade seats are described in
column 3 of the table. Roughly 130,000 listed a Grade A school for which seats are assigned
in the match on their application form and a little over a third of these were assigned to
a Grade A school.18 Applicants in the match have baseline scores (from tests taken in 6th
grade) above the overall district mean (baseline scores are standardized to the population of
test-takers). As can be seen by comparing columns 3 and 4 in Table 2, however, the average
characteristics of Grade A applicants are mostly similar to those of the entire applicant
population.
The statistics in column 5 of Table 2 show that applicants enrolled in a Grade A school
(among schools participating in the match) are somewhat less likely to be black and have
higher baseline scores than the total applicant pool. These gaps likely reflect systematic
differences in offer rates by race at screened Grade A schools. Column 5 of Table 2 also
shows that most of those attending a Grade A school were assigned there, and that most
Grade A students ranked a Grade A school first. Grade A students are about twice as likely
17

These composite variables are determined as a function of Regents and AP scores, course grades,
vocational or arts certification, and college admission tests.
18
The difference between total 9th grade enrollment and the number of match participants is accounted
for by special education students outside the main match, direct-to-charter enrollment, and a few schools
that straddle 9th grade.

23

to go to a lottery school as to a screened school. Interestingly, enthusiasm for Grade A
schools is far from universal: just under half of all applicants in the match ranked a Grade
A school first.
Table 2. High School Student Characteristics
Ninth Grade Students
Eighth Grade Applicants in the Match
Enrolled in
Listed
Enrolled in At Risk at
All
All
Grade A
Grade A
Grade A
Grade A
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Demographic variables
Black
Hispanic
Female
Special education
English language learners
Free lunch
Baseline scores
Math (standardized)
English (standardized)
Offer rates at a …
Grade A school
Grade A screened school
Grade A lottery school
Listed Grade A first
9th grade enrollment at a …
Grade A school
Grade A screened school
Grade A lottery school

30.7
40.2
49.2
19.0
7.5
78.6

19.5
33.6
53.2
5.6
4.3
69.5

29.1
38.9
51.5
7.6
6.0
77.3

29.3
39.3
52.5
7.3
5.7
77.2

22.4
38.2
54.1
6.4
5.1
73.2

21.7
38.7
51.7
5.7
4.7
74.4

0.056
0.022

0.547
0.484

0.207
0.168

0.233
0.196

0.348
0.301

0.392
0.327

85.0
26.9
58.1
83.9

29.4
9.0
20.4
47.3

34.6
10.5
24.0
55.6

91.3
25
66.3
85.9

48.2
15.3
32.9
77.8

100
38.3
61.7

31.1
12.1
18.9

35.8
13.7
22.1

100
26.1
73.9

49.1
19
30.2

29.5
10.4
19.1

Students
182,249
46,682
153,211
130,242
38,156
35,132
Schools
603
175
569
567
159
523
School-year observations
1672
355
1584
1562
319
1420
Notes. This table describes NYC 9th graders and high school match participants. Columns 1 and 2 show statistics for
students enrolled in ninth grade in the 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15 school years with non-missing demographics and
baseline test scores. Columns 3-6 show statistics for ninth grade applicants who participated in the NYC high school
match one year earlier. In columns 4-6, "Grade A" refers to Grade A schools that participate in the main NYC high
school match. The sample used for column 6 is limited to applicants with an estimated propensity score strictly between
0 and 1. Baseline scores are from sixth grade and demographic variables from eighth grade.

5.2

Balance and 2SLS Estimates

Because NYC has a single lottery tie-breaker, the disqualification probability at lottery
schools in Bθs described by equation (8) simplifies to
1
λs (θ) = (1 − M IDθs
),
1
where M IDθs
is most informative disqualification at schools using the common lottery tiebreaker, R1i . The local DA score described by equation (9) therefore also simplifies, in this
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case to:

1

 σs (θ, T )(1 − M IDθs )
1
ψs (θ, T ) =
σs (θ, T ) max {0, τs − M IDθs
}


1
σs (θ, T )(1 − M IDθs ) × 0.5

if ts = a,
if ts = c and v(s) = 1,
if ts = c and v(s) > 1.

(14)

Estimates of the local DA score based on (14) reveal that roughly 35,000 applicants have
Grade A risk, that is, an estimated local DA score value strictly between 0 and 1. As can
be seen in column 6 of Table 2, applicants with Grade A risk have mean baseline scores
and demographic characteristics much like those of the sample enrolled at a Grade A school.
The ratio of screened to lottery enrollment among those with Grade A risk is also similar to
the corresponding ratio in the sample of enrolled students (compare 32.9/15.3 in the former
group to 66.3/25.0 in the latter). Online Appendix Figure D1 plots the distribution of Grade
A assignment probabilities for applicants with risk. The modal probability is 0.5, reflecting
the fact that roughly 25% of those with Grade A risk rank a single Grade A school and that
this school is screened.
The balancing property of local propensity score conditioning is evaluated using scorecontrolled differences in covariate means for applicants who do and don’t receive Grade A
assignments. Score-controlled differences by Grade A assignment status are estimated in
a model that includes a dummy indicating assignments at ungraded schools as well as a
dummy for Grade A assignments, controlling for the propensity scores for both. We account
for ungraded school attendance to ensure that estimated Grade A effects compare schools
with high and low grades, omitting the ungraded.19 Specifically, let DAi denote Grade A
assignments as before, and let D0i indicate assignments at ungraded schools. Assignment
risk for each type of school is controlled using sets of dummies denoted dAi (x) and d0i (x),
respectively, for score values indexed by x.
The covariates of interest here, denoted by Wi , are those that are unchanged by school
assignment and should therefore be mean-independent of DAi in the absence of selection bias.
The balance test results reported in Table 3 are estimates of parameter γA in regressions of
Wi on DAi of the form:
Wi = γA DAi + γ0 D0i +

X

αA (x)dAi (x) +

x

X

α0 (x)d0i (x) + g(Ri ; δN ) + νi .

(15)

x

19

Ungraded schools were mostly new when grades were assigned or had data insufficient to determine a
grade.
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Local piecewise linear control for screened tie-breakers is parameterized as:
g(Ri ; δN ) =

X

ω1s ais + kis [ω2s + ω3s (Riv(s) − τs ) + ω4s (Riv(s) − τs )1(Riv(s) > τs )], (16)

s∈S\S0

where S\S0 is the set of screened programs, ais indicates whether applicant i applied to
screened program s, and kis = 1[t̂is (δN ) = c]. The sample used to estimate (15) is limited to
applicants with Grade A risk.
Parameters in (15) and (16) vary by application cohort (three cohorts are stacked in the
estimation sample). Bandwidths are estimated two ways, as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK) using a uniform kernel, and using methods and software described in
Calonico et al. (2017) (CCFT). These bandwidths are computed separately for each program
(the notation ignores this), for the set of applicants in the relevant marginal priority group.20
As can be seen in column 2 of Table 3, which reports raw differences in means by Grade
A assignment status, applicants assigned to a Grade A school are much more likely to have
ranked a Grade A school first, and ranked more Grade A schools highly than did other
applicants. These applicants are also more likely to rank a Screened Grade A school first
and among their top three. Minority and free-lunch-eligible applicants are less likely to be
assigned to a Grade A school, while those assigned to a Grade A school have much higher
baselines scores, with gaps of 0.3 − 0.4 in favor of those assigned. These raw differences
notwithstanding, our theoretical results suggest that estimates of γA in equation (15) should
be close to zero.
This is borne out by the estimates reported in column 4 of the table, which shows small,
mostly insignificant differences in covariates by assignment status when estimated using using
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidths. The estimated covariate gaps in column 6,
computed using Calonico et al. (2017) bandwidths, are similar. These estimates establish
the empirical relevance of both the large-market model of DA and the local DA propensity
score derived from it.21
20

The IK bandwidths used here are identical to those yielded by the IK implementation referenced in
Armstrong and Kolesár (2018) and distributed via the RDhonest package. Bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome variable; we use the smallest of these for each program. The bandwidth for screened
programs is set to zero when there are fewer than five in-bandwidth observations on one or the other side of
the relevant cutoff. The control function g(Ri ; δN ) is unweighted and can therefore be said to use a uniform
kernel. We also explored bandwidths designed to produce balance as in Cattaneo et al. (2016b). These
results proved to be sensitive to implementation details such as the p-value used to establish balance.
21
Our balance assessment relies on linear models to estimate mean differences rather than comparisons
of distributions. The focus on means is justified because the IV reduced form relationships we aspire to
validate are themselves regressions. Recall that in a regression context, reduced form causal effects are
unbiased provided omitted variables are mean-independent of the instrument, DAi . Since treatment variable
DAi is a dummy, the regression of omitted control variables on it is given by the difference in conditional
control variable means computed with DAi switched on and off.
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Table 3. Statistical Tests for Balance
Applicants with Grade A Risk
IK bandwidth
CCFT bandwidth
Non-offered
Non-offered
Non-offered
Offer gap
Offer gap
Offer gap
mean
mean
mean
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Panel A. Application Covariates
0.393
0.483
0.736
0.020
0.787
0.017
(0.002)
(0.005)
(0.006)
0.777
0.211
0.967
0.004
0.973
0.003
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
0.163
0.191
0.254
0.014
0.139
0.006
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.005)
0.322
0.143
0.419
0.008
0.259
0.001
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.006)
Panel B. Baseline Covariates
0.339
-0.130
0.225
-0.001
0.255
0.001
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.008)
0.406
-0.055
0.389
-0.001
0.451
0.001
(0.003)
(0.007)
(0.009)
0.527
0.003
0.519
-0.001
0.507
-0.010
(0.003)
(0.007)
(0.009)
0.078
-0.019
0.057
-0.000
0.075
-0.006
(0.001)
(0.004)
(0.005)
0.061
-0.014
0.046
0.003
0.061
0.000
(0.001)
(0.003)
(0.005)
0.807
-0.100
0.768
-0.010
0.795
-0.013
(0.003)
(0.007)
(0.008)
All Applicants

Grade A listed first
Grade A listed in top 3
Screened Grade A listed first
Screened Grade A listed in top 3

Black
Hispanic
Female
Special education
English language learners
Free lunch
Baseline scores
Math (standardized)
English (standardized)

0.109
0.080

N
Number of program-year combinations
Average number of students in bandwidth

0.379
(0.005)
0.349
(0.006)

0.330
0.258

130,160

0.004
(0.010)
0.014
(0.011)
35,102
999
196

0.118
0.075

-0.005
(0.012)
0.014
(0.014)
22,203
976
58

Notes. This table reports balance statistics computed by regressing covariates on dummies indicating Grade A and ungraded school
offers. Column 2 reports uncontrolled Grade A offer gaps. Estimates in columns 4 and 6 are from models that control for saturated
Grade A and ungraded offer propensity scores, year effects, and running variables. Estimates in column 4 were computed using
screened program bandwidths calculated as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012); estimates in column 6 use the Calonico
et al. (2019) bandwidth formula. The sample is limited to applicants with non-missing demographic variables and baseline test scores.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.

Causal effects of Grade A attendance are estimated by 2SLS using assignment dummies
as instruments for years of exposure to schools of a particular type, as suggested by equations
(1) and (2). As in the setup used to establish covariate balance, however, the 2SLS estimating
equations include two endogenous variables, CAi for Grade A exposure and C0i measuring
exposure to an ungraded school. Exposure is measured in years for SAT outcomes; otherwise,
CAi and C0i are enrollment dummies. As in equation (15), local propensity score controls
consist of saturated models for Grade A and ungraded propensity scores, with local linear
control for screened tie-breakers as described by equation (16). These equations also control
for baseline math and English scores, free lunch, special education, and English language
learner dummies, and gender and race dummies (estimates without these controls are similar,
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though less precise).22
OLS estimates of Grade A effects, reported as a benchmark in the second column of Table
4, indicate that Grade A attendance is associated with higher SAT scores and graduation
rates, as well as increased college and career readiness. The OLS estimates in Table 4 are
from models that omit local propensity score controls, computed in a sample that includes
all participants in the high school match without regard to assignment probability. OLS
estimates of the SAT gains associated with Grade A enrollment are around 6-7 points.
Estimated graduation gains are similarly modest at 2.4 points, but effects on college and
career readiness are substantial, running 7-10 points on a base rate around 40.
The first stage effects of Grade A assignments on Grade A enrollment, shown in columns
4 and 6 of Panel A in Table 4, show that Grade A offers boost Grade A enrollment by
about 1.8 years between the time of application and SAT test-taking. Grade A assignments
boost the likelihood of any Grade A enrollment by about 67 percentage points. This can
be compared with Grade A enrollment rates of 16-19 percent among those not assigned a
Grade A seat in the match.23
In contrast with the OLS estimates in column 2, the 2SLS estimates shown in columns
4 and 6 of Table 4 suggest that most of the SAT gains associated with Grade A attendance
reflect selection bias. Computed with either bandwidth, 2SLS estimates of SAT math gains
are around 2 points, though still (marginally) significant. 2SLS estimates of SAT reading effects are even smaller and not significantly different from zero, though estimated with similar
precision. At the same time, the 2SLS estimate for graduation status shows a statistically
significant gain of 3-4 percentage points, exceeding the corresponding OLS estimate. The
estimated standard error of 0.009 associated with the graduation estimate in column 4 seems
especially noteworthy, as this suggests that our research design has the power to uncover
even modest improvements in high school completion rates.24
22
Replacing Wi on the left hand side of (15) with outcome variable Yi , equations (15) and (16) describe
the reduced form for our 2SLS estimator. In an application with lottery tie-breaking, Abdulkadiroğlu et al.
(2017a) compare score-controlled 2SLS estimates with semiparametric instrumental variables estimates based
on Abadie (2003). The former are considerably more precise than the latter.
23
The gap between assignment and enrollment arises from several sources. Applicants remaining in the
public system may attend charter or non-match exam schools. Applicants may also reject a match-based
assignment, turning instead to an ad hoc administrative assignment process later in the year.
24
Estimates reported in Online Appendix Table D5 show little difference in follow-up rates between
applicants who are and aren’t offered a Grade A seat. The 2SLS estimates in Table 4 are therefore unlikely
to be compromised by differential attrition.
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Table 4. Estimates of the Effect of Attending a Grade A School
Applicants with Grade A risk
All Applicants
IK bandwidth
CCFT bandwidth
NonNon-offered
Non-offered
OLS
2SLS
2SLS
enrolled
mean
mean
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Panel A. First Stage Estimates
Years enrolled
(SAT outcomes)

0.547

1.79
(0.021)

0.453

1.84
(0.027)

Ever enrolled
(dummy outcomes)

0.186

0.644
(0.006)

0.158

0.666
(0.007)

490
(98)

2.33
(0.847)

Panel B. Second Stage Estimates
7.44
521
1.74
(0.153)
(111)
(0.669)

SAT Math
(200-800)

474
(103)

SAT Reading
(200-800)

474
(90)

5.88
(0.139)
124,902

515
(94)

-0.056
(0.617)
26,526

489
(85)

0.804
(0.775)
15,635

0.739

0.024
(0.002)
183,526

0.831

0.030
(0.009)
34,191

0.790

0.038
(0.013)
21,474

College- and careerprepared

0.429

0.101
(0.003)

0.608

0.083
(0.013)

0.501

0.114
(0.019)

College-ready

0.374

N
Graduated
N

0.070
0.562
0.054
0.447
0.049
(0.003)
(0.013)
(0.017)
N
121,416
22,168
13,550
Notes. This table reports estimates of the effects of Grade A enrollment on the outcomes indicated at left. Estimated effects
on college outcomes use the first two application cohorts only. OLS estimates are from models that omit propensity score
and running variable controls and include all students in the match. 2SLS estimates treat Grade A and ungraded school
enrollment as endogenous, limiting the sample to students with Grade A assignment risk. These estimates are from models
that include propensity score and running variable controls. Bandwidths are as described in the note to Table 3. Enrollment
is measured in years for SAT outcomes, and as a dummy variable for graduation and college outcomes. All models include
controls for baseline math and English scores, free lunch status, SPED and ELL status, gender, and race/ethnicity indicators.
Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis below control means; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below
OLS and 2SLS estimates.

The strongest Grade A effects appear in estimates of effects on college and career preparedness and college readiness. This may in part reflect the fact that Grade A schools are
especially likely to offer advanced courses, the availability of which contributes to the collegeand career-related composite outcome variables (the online appendix details the construction of these variables). 2SLS estimates of effects on these outcomes are mostly close to the
corresponding OLS estimates (three out of four are smaller). Here too, switching bandwidth
matters little for magnitudes. Throughout Table 4, however, 2SLS estimates computed with
an IK bandwidth are more precise than those computed using CCFT.

5.3

Screened vs. Lottery Grade A Effects

In New York, education policy discussions often focus on access to academically selective
screened schools such as Townsend Harris in Queens, a school consistently ranked among
29

the top American high schools by U.S. News and World Report. Public interest in screened
schools motivates an analysis that distinguishes screened from lottery Grade A effects. The
possibility of different effects within the Grade A sector also raises concerns related to the
exclusion restriction underpinning a causal interpretation of 2SLS estimates. In the context
of our causal model of Grade A effects, the exclusion restriction fails when the offer of
a Grade A seat moves applicants between schools of different quality within the Grade A
sector. We therefore explore multi-sector models that distinguish causal effects of attendance
at different sorts of Grade A schools, focusing on differences by admissions regime since this
is widely believed to matter for school quality.
The multi-sector estimates reported in Table 5 are from models that include separate
endogenous variables for screened and lottery Grade A schools, along with a third endogenous
variable for the ungraded sector. Instruments in this just-identified set-up are two dummies
indicating each sort of Grade A offer, as well as a dummy indicating the offer of a seat at an
ungraded school. 2SLS models include separate saturated local propensity score controls for
screened Grade A offer risk, unscreened Grade A offer risk, and ungraded offer risk. These
multi-sector estimates are computed in a sample limited to applicants at risk of assignment
to either a screened or lottery Grade A school. In view of the relative precision of estimates
using IK bandwidth, multi-sector estimates using CCFT bandwidths are omitted.
OLS estimates again provide an interesting benchmark. As can be seen in the first two
columns of Table 5, screened Grade A students appear to reap a large SAT advantage even
after controlling for baseline achievement and other covariates. In particular, OLS estimates
of Grade A effects for schools in the screened sector are on the order of 14-18 points. At
the same time, Grade A lottery schools appear to generate achievement gains of only about
2 points. Yet the corresponding 2SLS estimates, reported in columns 3 and 4 of the table,
suggest the achievement gains yielded by enrollment in both sorts of Grade A schools are
equally modest. The 2SLS estimates here run less than 2 points for math scores, with smaller
(not significant) negative estimates for reading. The sole statistically significant SAT effect
is that for the lottery Grade A school impact on math scores.
The remaining 2SLS estimates in the table likewise show similar screened-school and
lottery-school effects. With one marginal exception, p-values in the table reveal estimates
for the two sectors to be statistically indistinguishable. As in Table 4, the 2SLS estimates in
Table 5 suggest that screened and lottery Grade A schools boost graduation rates by about
3 points. Effects on college and career preparedness are larger for lottery schools than for
screened, but this impact ordering is reversed for effects on college readiness. On the whole,
Table 5 leads us to conclude that OLS estimates showing a large screened Grade A advantage
are driven by selection bias.
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Table 5. Grade A Effects by Admissions Regime
2SLS
OLS
Screened
Lottery
Screened
Lottery
Grade A
Grade A
Grade A
Grade A
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
SAT Math
(200-800)

17.6
(0.235)

2.47
(0.165)

0.578
(1.11)
0.264

p-value
SAT Reading
(200-800)

14.3
(0.216)
p-value
N

Graduated

1.80
(0.15)

-0.277
(1.03)

p-value
N

0.021
(0.002)

0.034
(0.013)

0.085
(0.003)

0.067
(0.019)

0.092
(0.014)
0.220

p-value
College-ready

0.025
(0.010)
0.486
36,907

183,526
0.138
(0.004)

-0.169
(0.656)
0.919
28,944

124,902
0.029
(0.002)

College- and careerprepared

1.87
(0.715)

0.136
(0.004)

0.043
(0.003)

0.081
(0.019)

0.046
(0.014)

0.076
p-value
121,416
23,861
N
Notes. This table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of Grade A enrollment effects in models that
distinguish between screened and lottery Grade A effects. These estimates were computed using models
similar to those used to computee the estimates in Table 4. Here, however, Grade enrollment is interacted
with a dummy for admissions regime and offer instruments are regime-specific. Propensity score controls
likewise distinguish between Grade A risk at screened and lottery schools. P-values in the table are for
tests of the equality of screened and lottery Grade A effects. Robust standard errors appear in
parenthesis.

6

Summary and Next Steps

Centralized student assignment opens new opportunities for the measurement of school quality. The research potential of matching markets is enhanced here by marrying the conditional
random assignment generated by lottery tie-breaking with RD-style variation at screened
schools. The key to this intermingled empirical framework is a local propensity score that
controls for differential assignment rates in DA matches with general tie-breakers. This
new tool allows us to exploit all sources of quasi-experimental variation arising from any
mechanism in the DA class.
Our analysis of NYC school report cards suggests Grade A schools boost SAT math
scores and high school graduation rates by a few points. OLS estimates, by contrast, show
considerably larger effects of Grade A attendance on test scores. Grade A screened schools
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enroll some of the city’s highest achievers, but large OLS estimates of achievement gains from
attendance at these schools appear to be an artifact of selection bias. Concerns about access
to such schools (expressed, for example, in Harris and Fessenden (2017)) may therefore be
overblown. On the other hand, Grade A attendance increases measures of college and career
preparedness. These results may reflect the greater availability of advanced courses in Grade
A schools, a feature that should be replicable at other schools.
In principle, Grade A assignments may act to move applicants between schools within
the Grade A sector as well as to boost overall Grade A enrollment. Offer-induced movement
between screened and lottery Grade A schools may violate the exclusion restriction that
underpins our 2SLS results if schools within the Grade A sector vary in quality. It’s therefore
worth asking whether screened and lottery schools should indeed be treated as having the
same effect. Perhaps surprisingly, our analysis supports the idea that screened and lottery
Grade A schools can be pooled and treated as having a common average causal effect.
Our provisional agenda for further research prioritizes an investigation of econometric
implementation strategies for DA-founded research designs. This work is likely to build on
the asymptotic framework in Bugni and Canay (2018) and the study of RD designs with
multiple tie-breakers in Papay et al. (2011), Zajonc (2012), Wong et al. (2013b) and Cattaneo
et al. (2019). It may be possible to extend the reasoning behind doubly robust nonparametric
estimators, such as discussed by Rothe and Firpo (2019) and Rothe (2020), to our setting.
Statistical inference in Section 5 relies on conventional large sample reasoning of the
sort widely applied in empirical RD applications. It seems natural to consider permutation
or randomization inference along the lines suggested by Cattaneo et al. (2015, 2017), and
Canay and Kamat (2017), along with optimal inference and estimation strategies such as
those introduced by Armstrong and Kolesár (2018) and Imbens and Wager (2019). Also
on the agenda, Narita (2020) suggests a path toward generalization of the large-market
model of DA assignment risk. Finally, we look forward to a more detailed investigation of
the consequences of heterogeneous treatment effects for identification strategies of the sort
considered here.
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Appendix
A

Proof of Theorem 1

Let Fvi (r) denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Riv evaluated at r and define
Fv (r|θ) = E[Fvi (r)|θi = θ].

(17)

This is the fraction of type θ applicants with tie-breaker v below r (set to zero when type θ
ranks no schools using tie-breaker v). We may condition on additional events.
Recall that the joint distribution of tie-breakers for applicant i is assumed to be continuously differentiable with positive density. This assumption has the following implication:
The conditional distribution of tie-breaker v, Fv (r|e), is continuously differentiable, with
Fv0 (r|e) > 0 at any r = τ1 , ..., τS . Here, the conditioning event e is any event of the form that
θi = θ, Riu > ru for u = 1, ..., v − 1, and Ti (δ) = T .
Take any large market with the general tie-breaking structure in Section 4. For each
δ > 0 and each tie-breaker v = U + 1, ..., V + 1, let e(v) be short-hand notation for “θi =
u
θ, Riu > M IDθs
for u = 1, ..., v − 1, Ti (δ) = T, and Wi = w.” Similarly, e(1) is short-hand
notation for “θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T, and Wi = w.” Let ψs (θ, T, δ, w) ≡ E[Di (s)|e(1)] be the
assignment probability for an applicant with θi = θ, Ti (δ) = T, and characteristics Wi = w.
Our proofs use a lemma that describes this assignment probability. To state the lemma, for
v > U , let

v + δ|e(v)) − F (M ID v − δ|e(v))
F (M IDθs
v

θs
v
 v
if tb (δ) = c for some b ∈ Bθs
v
v − δ|e(v))
Fv (M IDθs |e(v)) − Fv (M IDθs
Φδ (v) ≡

1
otherwise.
We use this object to define Φδ ≡

QU

v=1 (1

v )
− M IDθs

QV

v=U +1 Φδ (v).

Finally, let




Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))



max 0, Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1)) if v(s) > U
0
(
)
Φδ ≡
v(s)
τs − M IDθs



if v(s) ≤ U.
max 0,
v(s)
1 − M IDθs

Lemma 1. In the general tie-breaking setting of Section 4, for any fixed δ > 0 such that
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v
δ < minθ,s,v |τs − M IDθ,s
|, we have:



 0
ψs (θ, T, δ, w) =
Φδ


Φδ × Φ0δ

if ts (δ) = n or tb (δ) = a for some b ∈ Bθs ,
otherwise and ts (δ) = a,
otherwise and ts (δ) = c.

Proof of Lemma 1. We start verifying the first line in ψs (θ, T, δ, w). Applicants who don’t
rank s have ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = 0. Among those who rank s, those of ts (δ) = n have ρθs >
ρs or, if v(s) 6= 0, ρθs = ρs and Riv(s) > τs + δ. If ρθs > ρs , then ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = 0. Even if
ρθs ≤ ρs , as long as ρθs = ρs and Riv(s) > τs + δ, student i never clears the cutoff at school
s so ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = 0.
To show the remaining cases, take as given that it is not the case that ts (δ) = n or tb (δ) =
a for some b ∈ Bθs . Applicants with tb (δ) 6= a for all b ∈ Bθs and ts (δ) = a or c may be
assigned b ∈ Bθs , where ρθb = ρb . Since the (aggregate) distribution of tie-breaking variables
for type θ students is F̂v (·|θ) = Fv (·|θ), conditional on Ti (δ) = T , the proportion of type θ
Q
Q
v
) Vv=U +1 Φδ (v)
applicants not assigned any b ∈ Bθs where ρθb = ρb is Φδ = Uv=1 (1 − M IDθs
v
since each Φδ (v) is the probability of not being assigned to any b ∈ Bθs
. To see why Φδ (v)
v
v
is the probability of not being assigned to any b ∈ Bθs , note that if tb (δ) 6= c for all b ∈ Bθs
,
v
v
then tb (δ) = n for all b ∈ Bθs so that applicants are never assigned to any b ∈ Bθs . Otherwise,
v
i.e., if tb (δ) = c for some b ∈ Bθs
, then applicants are assigned to s if and only if their values
v
of tie-breaker v clear the cutoff of the school that produces M IDθs
, where applicants have
ts (δ) = c. This event happens with probability
v
v
Fv (M IDθs
|e(v)) − Fv (M IDθs
− δ|e(v))
,
v
v
Fv (M IDθs + δ|e(v)) − Fv (M IDθs − δ|e(v))
v
implying that Φδ (v) is the probability of not being assigned to any b ∈ Bθs
.
Given this fact, to see the second line, note that every applicant of type ts (δ) = a who
is not assigned a higher choice is assigned s for sure because ρθs < ρs or ρθs + Riv(s) < ξs .
Therefore, we have
ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = Φδ .

Finally, consider applicants with ts (δ) = c. The fraction of those who are not assigned a
higher choice is Φδ , as explained above. Also, for tie-breaker v(s), the tie-breaker values of
v(s)
v(s)
these applicants are larger (worse) than M IDθs . If τs < M IDθs , then no such applicant
v(s)
is assigned s. If τs ≥ M IDθs , then the fraction of applicants who are assigned s conditional
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v(s)

on τs ≥ M IDθs is given by
(

v(s)

max 0,

Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − max{Fv(s) (M IDθs |e(V + 1)), Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))}
v(s)

Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − max{Fv(s) (M IDθs |e(V + 1)), Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))}

and

(
max 0,
v(s)

If M IDθs
implies

v(s)

τs − M IDθs

)
if v(s) > U

)
if v(s) ≤ U.

v(s)

1 − M IDθs

v(s)

v
| implies M IDθs
< τs , then δ < minθ,s,v |τs − M IDθ,s

< τs − δ. This in turn

v(s)

max{Fv(s) (M IDθs |e(V + 1)), Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))} = Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1)).
v(s)

v(s)

v
If M IDθs > τs , then δ < minθ,s,v |τs − M IDθ,s
| implies M IDθs > τs + δ. By the definition
u
of e(V + 1), Riu > M IDθs for u = 1, ..., V . Therefore, there is no applicant with Riv(s) >
v(s)
M IDθs and Riv(s) ∈ [τs − δ, τs + δ].
Hence, conditional on ts (δ) = c and not being assigned a choice preferred to s, the
probability of being assigned s is given by Φ0δ . Therefore, for students with ts (δ) = c, we
have ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = Φδ × Φ0δ .

Lemma 2. In the general tie-breaking setting of Section 4, for all s, θ, and sufficiently small
δ > 0, we have:


0
if ts (0) = n or tb (0) = a for some b ∈ Bθs ,





Φ∗δ
otherwise and ts (0) = a,




Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))

∗


 Φδ × F (τ + δ|e(V + 1)) − F (τ − δ|e(V + 1))
v(s) s
v(s) s
ψs (θ, T, δ, w) =
otherwise and ts (0) = c and v(s) > U.




v(s)

τs − M IDθs

∗

}
Φδ × max{0,


v(s)

1
−
M
ID

θs



otherwise and t (0) = c and v(s) ≤ U.

(18)

s

where

v
v

v
v
 Fv (M IDθs + δ|e(v)) − Fv (M IDθs |e(v)) if M IDθs
= τb and tb = c for some b ∈ Bθs
,
v
v
∗
F
(M
ID
+
δ|e(v))
−
F
(M
ID
−
δ|e(v))
v
v
Φδ (v) ≡
θs
θs

1
otherwise
and

41

Φ∗δ

U
V
Y
Y
v
≡
(1 − M IDθs )
Φ∗δ (v).
v=1

v=U +1

Proof of Lemma 2. The first line follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that ts (0) = n or tb (0) =
a for some b ∈ Bθs imply ts (δ) = n or tb (δ) = a for some b ∈ Bθs for sufficiently small δ > 0.
For the remaining lines, first note that conditional on ts (0) 6= n and tb (0) 6= a for all b ∈
Bθs , we have Φ∗δ (v) = Φδ (v) and so Φ∗δ = Φδ holds for small enough δ. Φ∗δ therefore is the
probability of not being assigned to a school preferred to s in the last three cases.
The second line is then by the fact that ts (0) = a implies ts (δ) = a for small enough
δ > 0. The third line is by the fact that for small enough δ > 0,
Φ0δ

Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
=
,
Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))

= max 0,



v
where we invoke Assumption 2, which implies M IDθs
6= τs . The last line directly follows
from Lemma 1.

We use Lemma 2 to derive Theorem 1. We characterize limδ→0 ψs (θ, T, δ, w) and show
that it coincides with ψs (θ, T ) in the main text. In the first case in Lemma 2, ψs (θ, T, δ, w)
is constant (0) for any small enough δ. The constant value is also limδ→0 ψs (θ, T, δ, w) in this
case.
To characterize limδ→0 ψs (θ, T, δ, w) in the remaining cases, note that by the differentiability of Fv (·|e(v)) (recall the continuous differentiability of Fvi (r|e)), L’Hopital’s rule implies:
0
Fv(s)
(τs |e(V + 1))
Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
=
= 0.5
0
δ→0 Fv(s) (τs + δ|e(V + 1)) − Fv(s) (τs − δ|e(V + 1))
2Fv(s) (τs |e(V + 1))

lim

and

v
v
v
Fv (M IDθs
+ δ|e(v)) − Fv (M IDθs
|e(v))
Fv0 (M IDθs
|e(v))
=
= 0.5.
v
v
v
0
δ→0 Fv (M ID + δ|e(v)) − Fv (M ID − δ|e(v))
2Fv (M IDθs |e(v))
θs
θs

lim

v

v

v
This implies limδ→0 Φ∗δ (v) = 0.51{M IDθs =τb and tb =c for some b∈Bθs } since 1{M IDθs
= τb and tb =
v
c for some b ∈ Bθs } does not depend on δ. Therefore

lim Φ∗δ
δ→0

U
Y
v
)0.5ms (θ,T )
=
(1 − M IDθs
v=1

v
v
where ms (θ, T ) = |{v > U : M IDθs
= τb and tb = c for some b ∈ Bθs
}|.
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Combining these limiting facts with the fact that the limit of a product of functions equals
the product of the limits of the functions, we obtain the following: limδ→0 ψs (θ, T, δ, w) = 0
if (a) ts = n or (b) tb = a for some b ∈ Bθs . Otherwise,


σs (θ, T )λs (θ)





v(s)
τs −M IDθs
σs (θ, T )λs (θ) max 0,
ψs (θ, T ) =
v(s)
1−M IDθs



 0.5σ (θ, T )λ (θ)
s
s

if ts = a
if ts = c and v(s) ≤ U
if ts = c and v(s) > U.

This expression coincides with ψs (θ, T ), completing the proof of Theorem 1.
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Online Appendices
B

Understanding Theorem 1

Figure B1 illustrates Theorem 1 for an applicant who ranks screened schools 1, 3, 5 and 6
and lottery schools 2 and 4, where school k is applicant’s k-th choice. The line next to each
school represents applicant position (priority plus tie-breaker) for each school. Schools with
the same colored lines have the same tie-breaker. Schools 1 and 5 use screened tie-breaker
2. Schools 2 and 4 use lottery tie-breaker 1. Schools 3 and 6 use screened tie-breaker 3.
Since school 1 has only one priority, positions run from 1 to 2. School 2 has two priority
groups, so positions run from 1 to 3. Figure B1 indicates the applicants position π by an
arrow. At screened schools, the brackets around the DA cutoff ξ represent the δ-neighborhood
around the cutoff.
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Figure B1: Illustrating Theorem 1

School
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Position (priority + tie-breaker)
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x1
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Assignment
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n/a

0
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2

n
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1

c
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1

∅

1

∅

t2

Screened

3

c

x3 - 1
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2

1

∅

0.5(1 - t2 )

Lottery

1

c

x4 - 3

1 - t2

2

0.5

3

0.5max{0, t4 - t2 }

Screened

2

c

x5 - 1
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2, 4

0.5

3

(0.5)2 (1 - max{t2, t4})

Screened

3

a

x6 - 1
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2, 4

0.52
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(0.5)2 (1 - max{t2, t4})

λs(θ)

σs(θ, T)

n/a

Notes: This figure illustrates Theorem 1 for one applicant listing six schools. The applicant has marginal priority (shown in bold) at each. Dashes mark
intervals in which offer risk is strictly between 0 and 1. The set of applicants subject to random assignment includes everyone with marginal priority at
lottery schools and applicants with tie-breakers inside the relevant bandwidth at screened schools. Same-color tie-breakers are shared. Schools 1, 3, 5,
and 6 are screened, while 2 and 4 have lottery tie-breakers. The applicant’s preferences are 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6. Arrows mark πis = ρis +Riv(s) ,
the applicant’s position at each school s. Lower πis is better. Integers indicate priorities ρs , and tick marks indicate the DA cutoff, ξs = ρs + τs .
Note that t6 = a, so this applicant is sure to be seated somewhere. The assignment probability therefore sums to 1: if τ2 ≥ τ4 , the probability of any
assignment is τ2 + 0.5 × (1 − τ2 ) + 0 + 2 × 0.52 × (1 − τ2 ) = 1; if τ2 < τ4 , this probability is τ2 + 0.5 × (1 − τ2 ) + 0.5 × (τ4 − τ2 ) + 2 × 0.52 × (1 − τ4 ) = 1.

The applicant is never seated at school 1 since his position is to the right of the δneighborhood, conditionally seated at schools 2 and 4 since his priority is equal to the
marginal priority at each school, conditionally seated at schools 3 and 5 since his position is
within the δ-neighborhood at each school, and always seated at school 6 since his position
is to the left of the δ-neighborhood.
The columns next to the lines record tie-breaker cutoff, τ , disqualification probability
at lottery schools, λ, schools contributing to λ, the disqualification probability at screened
schools, σ, schools contributing to σ, and assignment probability.
The local score at each school is computed as follows:
School 1 : The local score at school 1 is zero because ti1 (δ) = n.
School 2 : MID at school 2 is zero because this applicant ranks no other lottery school higher.
Hence, the second line of (9) applies and probability is given by the tie-breaker cutoff
at school 2, which is τ2 .
School 3 : Since ti3 (δ) = c, the third line of (9) applies. The local score at school 3 is the
probability of not being assigned to school 2, that is, 1 − τ2 , times 0.5. This last term
is the probability associated with being local to the cutoff at school 3.
School 4 : MID at school 4 is determined by the tie-breaker cutoff at school 2. When MID
exceeds the tie-breaker cutoff at school 4, then school 4 assignment probability is zero.
Otherwise, since ti3 (δ) = c and school 4 is a lottery school, the second line of (9)
applies. The probability is therefore 0.5 times the difference between the cutoff at
school 4 and MID.
School 5 : MID at school 5 is determined by the larger of the tie-breaker cutoffs at school 2
and school 4. Since ti5 (δ) = c, the third line of (9) applies, and the probability is
determined by (0.5)2 times λ, the disqualification probability at lottery schools.
School 6 : Finally, since ti6 (δ) = a, the first line of (9) applies and the local score becomes (0.5)2
times λ.
Since ti6 (δ) = a, the probabilities sum to 1. If τ2 ≥ τ4 , the probability of any assignment
is τ2 + 0.5 × (1 − τ2 ) + 2 × (0.5)2 × (1 − τ2 ) = 1. If τ2 < τ4 , the probability is τ2 + 0.5 × (1 −
τ4 ) + 0.5 × (τ4 − τ2 ) + 2 × 0.52 × (1 − τ4 ) = 1.
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C
C.1

Additional Results and Proofs
The DA Propensity Score

This appendix derives the DA propensity score defined as the probability of assignment conditional on type for all applicants, without regard to cutoff proximity. The serial dictatorship
propensity score discussed in Section 3.1 is a special case of this.
v
and priority status determine DA propensity score with general tie-breakers. For
M IDθs
this proposition, we assume that tie-breakers Riv and Riv0 are independent for v 6= v 0 .
Proposition 3 (The DA Propensity Score with General Tie-breaking). Consider DA with
multiple tie-breakers indexed by v, distributed independently of one another according to
Fv (r|θ). For all s and θ in this match,

0




 Q (1 − Fv (M IDv |θ))
θs
Qv
ps (θ) =
v
(1
−
F
(M
IDθs
|θ))

v
v6=v(s)n

o


 × max 0, F (τ |θ) − F (M IDv(s) |θ)
v(s) s
v(s)
θs
v(s)

if ρθs > ρs
if ρθs < ρs
if ρθs = ρs

v(s)

where Fv(s) (τs |θ) = τs and Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ) = M IDθs when v(s) ∈ {1, ..., U }.
Proposition 3, which generalizes an earlier multiple lottery tie-breaker result in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a), covers three sorts of applicants. First, applicants with less-thanmarginal priority at s have no chance of being seated there. The second line of the theorem
reflects the likelihood of qualification at schools preferred to s among applicants surely seated
at s when they can’t do better. Since tie-breakers are assumed independent, the probability
Q
v
|θ)).
of not doing better than s is described by a product over tie-breakers, v (1 − Fv (M IDθs
v
If type θ is sure to do better than s, then M IDθs
= 1 and the probability at s is zero.
Finally, the probability for applicants with ρθi s = ρs multiplies the term
Y

v
(1 − Fv (M IDθs
|θ))

v6=v(s)

by
n
o
v(s)
max 0, Fv(s) (τs |θ) − Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ) .
The first of these is the probability of failing to improve on s by virtue of being seated at
schools using a tie-breaker other than v(s). The second parallels assignment probability in
single-tie-breaker serial dictatorship: to be seated at s, applicants in ρθi s = ρs must have
v(s)
Riv(s) between M IDθs and τs .
47

Proposition 3 allows for single tie-breaking, lottery tie-breaking, or a mix of non-lottery
and lottery tie-breakers as in the NYC high school match. With a single tie-breaker, the
propensity score formula simplifies, omitting product terms over v:
Corollary 3 (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a)). Consider DA using a single tie-breaker, Ri ,
distributed according to FR (r|θ) for type θ. For all s and θ in this market, we have:


0



1 − FR (M IDθs |θ)
ps (θ) =



FR (τs |θ) − FR (M IDθs |θ)


 (1 − FR (M IDθs |θ)) × max 0,
1 − FR (M IDθs |θ)

if ρθs > ρs ,
if ρθs < ρs ,
if ρθs = ρs ,

where ps (θ) = 0 when M IDθs = 1 and ρθs = ρs , and M IDθs is as defined in Section 3,
applied to a single tie-breaker.
Common lottery tie-breaking for all schools further simplifies the DA propensity score.
When v(s) = 1 for all s, FR (M IDθs ) = M IDθs and FR (τs |θ) = τs , as in the Denver
match analyzed by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a). In this case, the DA propensity score
is a function only of M IDθs and the classification of applicants into being never, always,
and conditionally seated. This contrasts with the scores in Propositions 3 and 3, which
depend on the unknown and unrestricted conditional distributions of tie-breakers given type
(FR (τs |θ) and FR (M IDθs |θ) with a single tie-breaker; Fv (τs |θ) and Fv (M IDθs |θ) with general
tie-breakers). We therefore turn again to the local propensity score to isolate assignment
variation that is independent of type and potential outcomes.
Proof of Proposition 3
We prove Proposition 3 using a strategy to that used in the proof of Theorem 1 in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a). Note first that admissions cutoffs ξ in a large market do not depend
on the realized tie-breakers riv ’s: DA in the large market depends on the riv ’s only through
G(I0 ), defined as the fraction of applicants in set I0 = {i ∈ I | θi ∈ Θ0 , riv ≤ rv for all v}
with various choices of Θ0 and rv . In particular, G(I0 ) doesn’t depend on tie-breaker realizations in the large market. For the empirical CDF of each tie-breaker conditional on each
type, F̂v (·|θ), the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem for independent but non-identically distributed
random variables implies F̂v (·|θ) = Fv (·|θ) for any v and θ (Wellner, 1981). Since cutoffs ξ
are constant, marginal priority ρs is also constant for every school s.
Now, consider the propensity score for school s. First, applicants who don’t rank s have
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ps (θ) = 0. If ρθs > ρs , then ρθs > ρs . Therefore,
ps (θ) = 0 if ρθs > ρs or θ does not rank s.
Second, if ρθs ≤ ρs , then the type θ applicant may be assigned a preferred school s̃ ∈ Bθs ,
where ρθs̃ = ρs̃ . For each tie-breaker v, the proportion of type θ applicants assigned some
v
v
|θ). This means that for each v, the probability of not
where ρθs̃ = ρs̃ is Fv (M IDθs
s̃ ∈ Bθs
v
v
being assigned any s̃ ∈ Bθs where ρθs̃ = ρs̃ is 1−Fv (M IDθs
|θ). Since tie-breakers are assumed
to be distributed independently of one another, the probability of not being assigned any
v
s̃ ∈ Bθs where ρθs̃ = ρs̃ for a type θ applicant is Πv (1 − Fv (M IDθs
|θ)). Every applicant of
type ρθs < ρs who is not assigned a preferred choice is assigned s because ρθs < ρs . So
v
ps (θ) = Πv (1 − Fv (M IDθs
|θ)) if ρθs < ρs .

Finally, consider applicants of type ρθs = ρs who are not assigned a choice preferred
to s. The fraction of applicants ρθs = ρs who are not assigned a preferred choice is
v
Πv (1 − Fv (M IDθs
|θ)). Also, the values of the tie-breaking variable v(s) of these appliv(s)
v(s)
cants are larger than M IDθs . If τs < M IDθs , then no such applicant is assigned s. If
v(s)
τs ≥ M IDθs , then the fraction of applicants who are assigned s within this set is given
v(s)

by

Fv(s) (τs |θ)−Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ)
v(s)

1−Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ)

. Hence, conditional on ρθs = ρs and not being assigned a choice
v(s)

higher than s, the probability of being assigned s is given by max{0,

Fv(s) (τs |θ)−Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ)
v(s)
1−Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ)

}.

Therefore,
ps (θ) =

Y

(1 −

v
Fv (M IDθs
|θ))

n
o
v(s)
× max 0, Fv(s) (τs |θ) − Fv(s) (M IDθs |θ) if ρθs = ρs .

v6=v(s)

C.2

Proof of Theorem 2

The proof uses lemmas established below. The first lemma shows that the vector of DA
cutoffs computed for the sampled market, ξˆN , converges to the vector of cutoffs in the
continuum.
a.s.
Lemma 3. (Cutoff almost sure convergence) ξˆN −→ ξ where ξ denotes the vector of continuum market cutoffs.

This result implies that the estimated score converges to the large-market local score as
market size grows and bandwidth shrinks.
Lemma 4. (Estimated local propensity score almost sure convergence) For all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈ S,
a.s.
and T ∈ {a, c, n}S , we have ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) −→ ψs (θ, T ) as N → ∞ and δN → 0.
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The next lemma shows that the true finite market score with a fixed bandwidth, defined
as ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) ≡ EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δN ) = T ], also converges to ψs (θ, T ) as market size
grows and bandwidth shrinks.
Lemma 5. (Bandwidth-specific propensity score almost sure convergence) For all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈
S, T ∈ {a, c, n}S , and δN such that δN → 0 and N δN → ∞ as N → ∞, we have
p
ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) −→ ψs (θ, T ) as N → ∞.
a.s.

Finally, the definitions of ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) and ψN s (θ, T ) imply that |ψN s (θ, T ; δN )−ψN s (θ, T )| −→
0 as δN → 0. Combining these results shows that for all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈ S, and T , as N → ∞
and δN → 0 with N δN → ∞, we have
|ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) − ψN s (θ, T )|
=|ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) − ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) + ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) − ψN s (θ, T )|
≤|ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) − ψN s (θ, T ; δN )| + |ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) − ψN s (θ, T )|
p

−→|ψs (θ, T ) − ψs (θ, T )| + 0
=0.
This yields the theorem since Θ, S, and {n, c, a}S are finite.
Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3 in Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017a)
and available upon request. The main difference is that to deal with multiple non-lottery
tie-breakers, the proof of Lemma 3 needs to invoke the continuous differentiability of Fvi (r|e)
and the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem for independent but non-identically distributed random
variables (Wellner, 1981).
Proof of Lemma 4
ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) is almost everywhere continuous in finite sample cutoffs ξˆN , finite sample MIDs
v
v
(M IDθs
), and bandwidth δN . Since every M IDθs
is almost everywhere continuous in finite
sample cutoffs ξˆN , ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) is almost everywhere continuous in finite sample cutoffs ξˆN
a.s.
and bandwidth δN . Recall δN → 0 by assumption while ξˆN −→ ξ by Lemma 3. Therefore,
by the continuous mapping theorem, as N → ∞, ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) almost surely converges to
ψ̂s (θ, T (δN )) with ξ replacing ξˆN , which converges to ψs (θ, T ) as δN → 0.
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Proof of Lemma 5
We use the following fact, which is implied by Example 19.29 in van der Vaart (2000).
Lemma 6. Let X be a random variable distributed according to some CDF F over [0, 1].
Let F (·|X ∈ [x − δ, x + δ]) be the conditional version of F conditional on X being in a
small window [x − δ, x + δ] where x ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Let X1 , ..., XN be iid draws
from F . Let F̂N be the empirical CDF of X1 , ..., XN . Let F̂N (·|X ∈ [x − δ, x + δ]) be
the conditional version of F̂N conditional on a subset of draws falling in [x − δ, x + δ], i.e.,
{Xi |i = 1, ..., n, Xi ∈ [x−δ, x+δ]}. Suppose (δN ) is a sequence with δN ↓ 0 and δN ×N → ∞.
Then F̂N (·|X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ]) uniformly converges to F (·|X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ]), i.e.,
sup |F̂N (x0 |X ∈ [x−δN , x+δN ])−F (x0 |X ∈ [x−δN , x+δN ])| →p 0 as N → ∞ and δN → 0.
x0 ∈[0,1]

Proof of Lemma 6. We first prove the statement for x ∈ (0, 1). Let P be the probability
measure of X and P̂N be the empirical measure of X1 , ..., XN . Note that
sup |F̂N (x0 |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ]) − F (x0 |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ])|
x0 ∈[0,1]

= sup |F̂N (x + tδN |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ]) − F (x + tδN |X ∈ [x − δN , x + δN ])|
t∈[−1,1]

= sup |
t∈[−1,1]

=

P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ]
P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]
1

−

PX [x − δN , x + tδN ]
|
PX [x − δN , x + δN ]

P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]PX [x − δN , x + δN ]
× sup |P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ]PX [x − δN , x + δN ] − P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]PX [x − δN , x + tδN ]|
t∈[−1,1]

=

1
P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]PX [x − δN , x + δN ]
× sup |P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ](PX [x − δN , x + δN ] − P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ])
t∈[−1,1]

≤

+ P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ](P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ] − PX [x − δN , x + tδN ])|
1
P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]PX [x − δN , x + δN ]
× { sup P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ]|P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ] − PX [x − δN , x + δN ]|
t∈[−1,1]

+ sup P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ]|P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ] − PX [x − δN , x + tδN ]|}
t∈[−1,1]

=

1
× {|P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ] − PX [x − δN , x + δN ]|
PX [x − δN , x + δN ]
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+ sup |P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ] − PX [x − δN , x + tδN ]|}
t∈[−1,1]

=

AN
,
PX [x − δN , x + δN ]

where
AN = |P̂N [x−δN , x+δN ]−PX [x−δN , x+δN ]|+ sup |P̂N [x−δN , x+tδN ]−PX [x−δN , x+tδN ]|.
t∈[−1,1]

The above inequality holds by the triangle inequality and the second last equality holds
because supt∈[−1,1] P̂N [x − δN , x + tδN ] = P̂N [x − δN , x + δN ].
p
We show that AN /PX [x−δN , x+δN ] −→ 0. Example 19.29 in van der Vaart (2000) implies
p
that the sequence of processes { n/δN (P̂N [x−δN , x+tδN ]−PX [x−δN , x+tδN ]) : t ∈ [−1, 1]}
converges in distribution to a Gaussian process in the space of bounded functions on [−1, 1]
as N → ∞. We denote this Gaussian process by {Gt : t ∈ [−1, 1]}. We then use the
continuous mapping theorem to obtain
p
d
n/δN AN −→ |G1 | + sup |Gt |
t∈[−1,1]

as N → ∞. Since {Gt : t ∈ [−1, 1]} has bounded sample paths, it follows that |G1 | < ∞
and supt∈[−1,1] |Gt | < ∞ for sure. By the continuous mapping theorem, under the condition
that N δN → ∞,
p
p
(1/δN )AN = (1/ N δN ) × n/δN AN
d

−→ 0 × (|G1 | + sup |Gt |)
t∈[−1,1]

= 0.
p

This implies that (1/δN )AN −→ 0, because for any  > 0,
Pr(|(1/δN )AN | > ) = Pr((1/δN )AN < −) + Pr((1/δN )AN > )
≤ Pr((1/δN )AN ≤ −) + 1 − Pr((1/δN )AN ≤ )
→ Pr(0 ≤ −) + 1 − Pr(0 ≤ )
= 0,
d

p

where the convergence holds since (1/δN )AN −→ 0. To show that AN /PX [x−δN , x+δN ] −→
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0, it is therefore enough to show that limN →∞ (1/δN )PX [x − δN , x + δN ] > 0. We have
(1/δN )PX [x − δN , x + δN ] = (1/δN )(FX (x + δN ) − FX (x − δN ))
= (1/δN )(2f (x)δN + o(δN ))
= 2f (x) + o(1)
→ 2f (x)
> 0,
where we use Taylor’s theorem for the second equality and the assumption of f (x) > 0 for
the last inequality.
We next prove the statement for x = 0. Note that
sup |F̂N (x0 |X ∈ [−δN , δN ]) − F (x0 |X ∈ [−δN , δN ])|
x0 ∈[0,1]

= sup |F̂N (tδN |X ∈ [0, δN ]) − F (tδN |X ∈ [0, δN ])|
t∈[0,1]

= sup |

F̂N (tδN )

t∈[0,1]

F̂N (δN )
1

−

FX (tδN )
|
FX (δN )

sup |F̂N (tδN )FX (δN ) − F̂N (δN )FX (tδN )|
F̂N (δN )FX (δN ) t∈[0,1]
1
=
sup |F̂N (tδN )(FX (δN ) − F̂N (δN )) + F̂N (δN )(F̂N (tδN ) − FX (tδN ))|
F̂N (δN )FX (δN ) t∈[0,1]
1
≤
{ sup F̂N (tδN )|F̂N (δN ) − FX (δN )| + sup F̂N (δN )|F̂N (tδN ) − FX (tδN )|}
F̂N (δN )FX (δN ) t∈[0,1]
t∈[0,1]
A0N
1
=
{|F̂N (δN ) − FX (δN )| + sup |F̂N (tδN ) − FX (tδN )|} =
,
FX (δN )
FX (δN )
t∈[0,1]
=

where A0N = |F̂N (δN ) − FX (δN )| + supt∈[0,1] |F̂N (tδN ) − FX (tδN )|. By the argument used in
p
the above proof for x ∈ (0, 1), we have (1/δN )A0N −→ 0. It also follows that
(1/δN )FX (δN ) = (1/δN )(f (0)δN + o(δN ))
= f (0) + o(1)
→ f (0)
> 0.
A0

p

p

Thus, FX (δNN ) −→ 0, and hence supx0 ∈[0,1] |F̂N (x0 |X ∈ [−δN , δN ]) − F (x0 |X ∈ [−δN , δN ])| −→
0. The proof for x = 1 follows from the same argument.
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Consider any deterministic sequence of economies {gN } such that gN ∈ G for all N
and gN → G in the (G, d) metric space. Let (δN ) be an associated sequence of positive
numbers (bandwidths) such that δN → 0 and N δN → ∞ as N → ∞. Let ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) ≡
EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δN ) = T ] be the (finite-market, deterministic) bandwidth-specific propensity score for particular gN and δN .
For Lemma 5, it is enough to show deterministic convergence of this finite-market score,
that is, ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) → ψs (θ, T ) as gN → G and δN → 0. To see this, let GN be the
distribution over I(Θ0 , r0 , r1 )’s induced by randomly drawing N applicants from G, where
a.s.
I(Θ0 , r0 , r1 ) ≡ {i|θi ∈ Θ0 , r0 < ri ≤ r1 }. Note that GN is random and that GN → G by
Wellner (1981)’s Glivenko-Cantelli theorem for independent but non-identically distributed
p
random variables. GN → G and ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) → ψs (θ, T ) allow us to apply the Extended Continuous Mapping Theorem (Theorem 18.11 in van der Vaart (2000)) to obtain
p
ψ̃N s (θ, T ; δN ) −→ ψs (θ, T ) where ψ̃N s (θ, T ; δN ) is the random version of ψN s (θ, T ; δN ) defined
for GN .
For notational simplicity, consider the single-school RD case, where there is only one
school s making assignments based on a single non-lottery tie-breaker v(s) (without using
any priority). A similar argument with additional notation shows the result for DA with
general tie-breaking.
For any δN > 0, whenever Ti (δN ) = a, it is the case that Di (s) = 1. As a result,
ψN s (θ, a; δN ) ≡ EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δN ) = a] = 1 ≡ ψs (θ, a).
Therefore, ψN s (θ, a; δN ) → ψs (θ, a) as N → ∞. Similarly, for any δN > 0, whenever Ti (δN ) =
n, it is the case that Di (s) = 0. As a result,
ψN s (θ, n; δN ) ≡ EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δN ) = n] = 0 ≡ ψs (θ, n).
Therefore, ψN s (θ, n; δN ) → ψs (θ, n) as N → ∞. Finally, when Ti (δN ) = c, let
PN
FN,v(s) (r|θ) ≡

i
1{θi = θ}Fv(s)
(r)
PN
i=1 1{θi = θ}

i=1

be the aggregate tie-breaker distribution conditional on each applicant type θ in the finite
market. ξ˜N s denotes the random cutoff at school s in a realized economy gN . For any ,
there exists N0 such that for any N > N0 , we have
ψN s (θ, c; δN ) ≡ EN [Di (s)|θi = θ, Ti (δN ) = c]

54

= PN [Riv(s) ≤ ξ˜N s |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξ˜N s − δN , ξ˜N s + δN ]]
∈ (P [Riv(s) ≤ ξs |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξs − δN , ξs + δN ]] − /2,
P [Riv(s) ≤ ξs |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξs − δN , ξs + δN ]] + /2),
where ξs is school s’s continuum cutoff, P is the probability induced by the tie-breaker
distributions in the continuum economy, and the inclusion is by Assumption 2 and Lemmata
3 and 6. Again for any , there exists N0 such that for any N > N0 , we have
(P [Riv(s) ≤ ξs |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξs − δN , ξs + δN ]] − /2,
P [Riv(s) ≤ ξs |θi = θ, Riv(s) ∈ (ξs − δN , ξs + δN ]] + /2)
Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)
− /2,
Fv(s) (ξs + δN |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)
Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)
+ /2)
Fv(s) (ξs + δN |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)
{Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)}/δN
=(
− /2,
{Fv(s) (ξs + δN |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs |θ)}/δN + {Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)}/δN
{Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)}/δN
+ /2)
{Fv(s) (ξs + δN |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs |θ)}/δN + {Fv(s) (ξs |θ) − Fv(s) (ξs − δN |θ)}/δN
=(

∈ (0.5 − , 0.5 + )
= (ψs (θ, c) − , ψs (θ, c) + ),
completing the proof.
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D
D.1

Empirical Appendix
Data

The NYC DOE provided data on students, schools, the rank-order lists submitted by match
participants, school assignments, and outcome variables. Applicants and programs are
uniquely identified by a number that can be used to merge data sets. Students with a
record in assignment files who cannot be matched to other files are omitted.
D.1.1

Applicant Data

We focus on first-time applicants to the NYC public (unspecialized) high school system who
live in NYC and attended a public middle school in eighth grade. The NYC high school
match is conducted in three rounds. The data used for the present analyses are from the first
assignment round, which uses DA and we refer to as main round. Applicants who were not
assigned after the main round apply to the remaining seats in a subsequent supplementary
round. Students who remain unassigned in the supplementary round are then assigned on a
case-by-case basis in the final administrative round.
Assignment, Priorities, and Ranks
Data on the assignment system come from the DOE’s enrollment office, and report assignments for our two cohorts. The main application data set details applicant program choices,
eligibility, priority group and rank, as well as the admission procedure used at the respective program. Lottery numbers and details on assignments at Educational Option (Ed-Opt)
programs are provided in separate data sets.
Student Characteristics
NYC DOE students files record grade, gender, ethnicity, and whether students attended a
public middle school. Separate files include (i) student scores on middle school standardized
tests, (ii) English language learner and special education status, and (iii) subsidized lunch
status. Our baseline middle school scores are from 6th grade math and English exams. If a
student re-took a test, the latest result is used. Our demographic characteristics come from
the DOE’s snapshot for 8th grade.
D.1.2

School-level Data

School Letter Grades
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School grades are drawn from NYC DOE School Report Cards for 2010/11, 2011/12 and
2012/13. For each application cohort, we grade schools based on the report cards published
in the school year prior to the application school year: for the 2011/12 application cohort,
for instance, schools are assigned grades published in 2010/11, and similarly for the other
two cohorts.
School Characteristics
School characteristics were taken from report card files provided by the DOE. These data
provide information on enrollment statistics, racial composition, attendance rates, suspensions, teacher numbers and experience, and graduating class Regents Math and English
performance. A unique identifier for each school allows these data to be merged with data
from other sources. The analyses on teacher experience and education reported in Table 2
of this publication are based on the School-Level Master File 1996-2016, a dataset compiled
by the Research Alliance for NYC Schools at New York University’ Steinhardt School of
Culture, Education, and Human Development (www.ranycs.org). All data in the SchoolLevel Master File are publicly available. The Research Alliance takes no responsibility for
potential errors in the dataset or the analysis. The opinions expressed in this publication
are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Research Alliance for NYC
Schools or the institutions that posted the original publicly available data.25
Defining Screened and Lottery Schools
We define lottery schools as any school hosting at least one program for which the lottery
number is used as the tie-breaker. Screened schools are the remaining schools. Some schools
allow students to share a screened tie-breaker rank, breaking screening-variable ties with
lottery numbers. Propensity scores for such schools are computed using the lottery tie breaker
and schools are considered lottery in any analysis that makes this substantive distinction.
Specialized high schools are considered screened schools. The remaining schools, mostly
charters that conduct a separate lottery process, are considered lottery schools.
D.1.3

SAT and Graduation Outcomes

SAT Tests
The NYC DOE has data on SAT scores for test-takers from 2006-17. These data originate
with the College Board. We use the first test for multiple takers. For applicants tested in
the same month, we use the highest score. During our sample period, the SAT has been
25

Research Alliance for New York City Schools (2017). School-Level Master File 1996-2016 [Data file and
code book]. Unpublished data
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redesigned. We re-scale scores of SAT exams taken prior to the reform according to the
official re-scaling scheme provided by CollegeBoard.26
Graduation
The DOE Graduation file records the discharge status for public school students enrolled
from 2005-17. Because data on graduation results are not yet available for the youngest
(2013/14) cohort, graduation results are for the two older cohorts only.
College- and Career-preparedness and College-readiness
The DOE provided us with individual-level indicators for college- and career-preparedness
as well as college-readiness for public school students enrolled from 2005-17. Since these
data are not yet available for the youngest (2013/14) cohort, the results are for the two older
cohorts only. Table D1 gives an overview on the criteria for the two indicators.
Table D1. Criteria for College- and Career-preparedness and College-readiness Indicators
College- and Career-preparedness
Any of the following:
- Scored 65+ on the Algebra II, Math B, Chemistry, or Physics Regents exam
- Scored 3+ on any Advanced Placement (AP) or 4+ on any International Baccalaureate (IB) exam
- Earned “C” or higher in a college credit-bearing course or passed another course certified by the DOE
- Earned a diploma with a Career and Technical Education (CTE) endorsement
- Earned a diploma with an Arts endorsement; or passed an industry-recognized technical assessment
College-readiness
For ELA, any of the following:
- SAT Evidence-Based Reading and Writing (EBRW) section score of 480+
- ACT English score of 20+ or NY State English Regents score of 75+
For Math, any of the following:
- SAT Math Section score of 530+
- ACT Math score of 21+
- Common Core Regents: Score of 70+ in Algebra I or 70+ in Geometry or 65+ in Algebra 2
- Other Regents: Score of 80+ in Integrated Algebra or Geometry or Algebra 2/Trigonometry
and successful completion of the Algebra 2/Trigonometry or higher-level course
- Score of 75+ in Regents Math A or Math B, or Sequential II or Sequential III

D.1.4

Replicating the NYC Match

NYC uses the student-proposing DA algorithm to determine assignments. The three ingredients for this algorithm are: student’s ranking of up to 12 programs, program capacities
and priorities, and tie-breakers.
26

See https://collegereadiness.collegeboard.org/educators/higher-ed/scoring/concordance
for the conversion scale.
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Program Assignment Rules
Programs use a variety of assignment rules. Lottery, Limited Unscreened, and Zoned programs order students first by priority group, and within priority group by lottery number.
Screened and Audition programs order students by priority group and then by a non-lottery
tie-breaker, referred to as running or rank variable. We observe these in the form of an an
ordering of applicants provided by Screened and Audition programs. Ed-Opt programs use
two tie-breakers, which is described into more detail below. Finally, as mentioned above,
some schools allow students to share a screened tie-breaker rank, breaking screening-variables
ties with lottery numbers.
Program Capacities and Priorities
Program capacities must be imputed. We assume program capacity equals the number of
assignments extended. Program type determines priorities. The priority group is a number
assigned by the NYC DOE depending on addresses, program location, siblings, among other
considerations, including, in some cases, whether applicants attended an information session
or open house (for Limited Unscreened programs).
Lottery Numbers
The lottery numbers are provided by the NYC DOE in a separate data set. Lottery tiebreakers are reported as unique alphanumeric string and scaled to [0, 1]. Lottery numbers
are missing for some; we assign these applicants a randomly drawn lottery number and use
it in our replicated match. It is this replicated match that is used to construct assignment
instruments and their associated propensity scores.
Ranks
Screened, Audition, and half of the seats at Ed-Opt programs assign students a rank, based
on various diverging criteria, such as former test performance. Ranks are reported as an integer reflecting raw tie-breaker order in this group. We scale these so as to lie in (0, 1] by transforming raw tie-breaking realizations Riv into [Riv − minj Rjv + 1]/[maxj Rjv − minj Rjv + 1]
for each tie-breaker v. At some screened programs, the rank numbers of applicants have
gaps, i.e. the distribution of running variable values is discontinuous. Potential reasons
include i) human error when school principals submit applicant rankings to the NYC DOE,
and ii) while running variables are assigned at the program level, applications at Ed-Opt
programs are treated as six separate buckets (i.e. distinct application choices), leading to
artificial gaps in rank distributions (see discussion of assignment at Ed-Opt programs below).
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Assignment at Educational Option programs
Ed-Opt programs use two tie-breakers. Applicants are first categorized into high performers,
middle performers, and low performers by scores on a seventh grade reading test. Ed-Opt
programs aim to have an enrollment distribution of 16% high performers, 68% middle performers and 16% low performers. Half of Ed-Opt seats are assigned using the lottery tiebreaker. These seats are called “random.” The other half uses a rank variable such as those
used by other screened programs. These seats are called “select.”
We refer to the resulting six combinations as “buckets.” Ed-Opt applicants are treated as
applying to all six. A separate data set details which bucket applicants were offered. Buckets have their own priorities and capacities. The latter are imputed based on the observed
assignments to buckets.
Tables D2 and D3 show applicants’ choice order of and priorities at Ed-Opt buckets, respectively. Both are based on consultations with the NYC DOE and our simulations of the match.
High performers rank high buckets first, while medium and low performers apply to medium
and low buckets first, respectively.
Table D2. Applicants' Choice Order of EdOpt Buckets
Choice
order
High performers
Middle performers Low performers
1

High

2
3

Select

Middle Select

Low

Select

High Random
Middle Select

Middle Random
High Select

Low
High

Random
Select

4
5

Middle Random
Low Select

High
Low

Random
Select

High Random
Middle Select

6

Low

Low

Random

Middle Random

Random

High performers have highest priority (priority group 1) at high buckets, while medium and
low performers receive highest priority at medium and low buckets, respectively.

Priority
Group
1
2
3

Table D3. Priorities at EdOpt Buckets
High
Middle
Low
Random or Select
Random or Select
Random or Select
High performers
Middle performers
Low performers
Middle performers
Low performers
Middle performers
Low performers
High performers
High performers

Miscellaneous Sample Restrictions The analysis sample is limited to first-time eighth
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grade applicants for ninth grade seats. Ineligible applications (as indicated in the main
application data set) are dropped. Applicants with special education status compete for a
different set of seats and are thus dropped in the analysis.
Students in the top 2% of scorers on the seventh grade reading are automatically admitted
into any Ed-Opt program they rank first. We gather these assignments in a separate Ed-Opt
bucket, thereby leaving the admission process to the other six unaffected.
Table D4 records the proportion of applicants for which our match replication was successful.

All schools

Table D4. Replication Rates
Application Cohort
2011/2012
2012/2013
2013/2014
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.967
0.959
0.967

Grade A schools

0.971

0.962

0.974

Grade A screened schools

0.990

0.988

0.990

Grade A lottery schools
0.965
0.956
0.965
Notes: This table shows replication rates for the New York City match for
the three application cohorts in the analysis sample. A replicated offer is one
where the offer generated by our run of the match coincides the offer
received.

D.2

Additional Empirical Results

Grade A risk has a mode at 0.5, but takes on many other values as well. A probability
of 0.5 arises when the overall Grade A propensity score is generated by a single Grade A
screened school. This can be seen in Figure D1, which tabulates the estimated probability of
assignment to a Grade A school for applicants in all cohorts (2012-2014) with a probability
strictly between 0 and 1 calculated using the formula in Theorem 1. There are 24,966
students with the estimated assignment probability equal to 1, 86,494 students with the
propensity score equal to 0, and 41,647 students with Grade A risk. The propensity score
of 0.5 arises when the overall Grade A propensity score is generated by a single Grade A
screened school.
Table D5 reports estimates of the effect of Grade A assignments on attrition, computed
by estimating models like those used to gauge balance. Applicants who receive Grade A
school assignments have a slightly higher likelihood of taking the SAT. Decomposing Grade
A schools into screened and lottery schools, applicants who receive lottery Grade A school
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Figure D1: Distribution of Grade A Risk

Notes: This figure shows the histogram of the estimated probability of assignment to a Grade A
school for at-risk applicants in all sample cohorts (2012-2014), calculated using Theorem 1. The
full sample includes 24,966 applicants with a Grade A propensity score equal to 1, 86,494 applicants
with propensity score equal to 0, and 35,102 students with Grade A risk. The at-risk sample is
used to compute the balance estimates reported in Table 3.
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assignments are 1.6 percent more likely to have SAT scores, while assignments to Grade A
screened schools do not correspond to a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of
having follow-up SAT scores. This modest difference seems unlikely to bias the 2SLS Grade
A estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Table D6 reports estimates of the effect of enrollment in an ungraded high school. These
use models like those used to compute the estimates presented in Table 4. OLS estimates
show a small positive effect of ungraded school attendance on SAT scores and a strong negative effect on graduation outcomes. 2SLS estimates, by contrast, suggest ungraded school
attendance is unrelated to these outcomes.

Took SAT exam

Enrolled in ninth grade

Table D5. Differential Attrition
NonGrade A School Type
offered
Any
Screened
Lottery
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.772
0.013
-0.005
0.016
(0.006)
(0.010)
(0.007)
N
35,102
13,742
28,643
0.642

0.003
0.001
0.003
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
N
35,102
13,742
28,643
Notes. This table reports differential Grade A offer effects on the availability of follow-up
data, computed by regressing a follow-up indicator on dummies for Grade A and ungraded
school offers, with the controls used for the balance estimates reported in Table 3. Robust
standard errors appear in parenthesis.
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Table D6. 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Attending an Ungraded School
All applicants
Applicants with Grade A Risk
Non-enrolled
Non-offered
OLS
2SLS
mean
mean
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
SAT Math
(200-800)

474
(103)

1.20
(0.189)

521
(111)

1.31
(1.72)

SAT Reading
(200-800)

474
(90)

1.06
(0.176)
124,902

515
(94)

0.023
(1.66)
26,526

0.739

-0.236
(0.003)
183,526

0.831

0.035
(0.024)
34,191

College- and Careerprepared

0.429

-0.134
(0.003)

0.608

0.035
(0.036)

College-ready

0.374

N
Graduated
N

-0.096
0.562
0.032
(0.003)
(0.035)
N
121,416
22,168
Notes. This table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of ungraded school effects produced by the
models reported in Table 4. Robust standard errors appear in parenthesis.

64

